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Judicial Intervention in a Twenty-First
Century Republic: Shuffling Deck Chairs
on the Titanic?t
KRISTOFOR J. HAMMoND*
There is no shortage of scholarship addressing the intriguing paradox that under
our seemingly democratic form of government, the actions and enactments of the
elected branches-the President and Congress-are susceptible to being
overturned by an unelected judiciary which answers to the Constitution rather
than majority will.' But for the impact of new technology on the law,2 many
would consider another exposition of the "countermajoritarian difficulty" theory3
to be a needless sacrifice of valuable timber. Yet recent developments suggesting
that America is experiencing the rise of technologically driven majoritarianism,
a "technological difficulty," have received little attention.
We are currently witnessing political and social instability characteristic of
periods of dramatic change, and much of that change can be traced to the
influence of emerging technology.4 Late twentieth century technology, from cable
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1. Professor Robert Hopperton notes that new ideas in this area "must get in line and
compete with an almost countless number of other approaches to constitutional theory
propounded by legal scholars and professional critics over the last four decades." Robert J.
Hopperton, Majoritarian and Counter-Majoritarian Difficulties: Democracy, Distrust, and
Disclosure in American Land-Use Jurisprudence, 24 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 541, 544
(1997). Professor Barry Friedman charges that the countermajoritarian difficulty "has been the
central obsession of modem constitutional scholarship." Barry Friedman, The History of the
Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part One: The Road to Judicial Supremacy, 73 N.Y.U. L. REv.
333, 334 (1998). Since "[t]he fixation is so great the proposition hardly requires citation," I
will refer readers to Friedman's recitation. Id. at 334 n.1.; see also Hopperton, supra, at 544
n.23.
2. The "shuffling the deck chairs" clichd in the title highlights two underlying themes in
this Note: that academic theory divorced from political implementation will not prevent an
impending disaster and that technology-the Titanic was a technological wonder in its
day--can be an instrument of grace or misfortune.
3. Although Alexander Bickel coined the phrase "countermajoritarian difficulty," he was
not the first scholar to broach the topic and certainly not the last. ALExANDER M. BICKEL, THE
LEAST DANGEROUS BRANcH 16 (1962).
4. Nearly 30 years ago, futurist Alvin Toffler recognized the connection between latter-
20th century technology, knowledge, and social change:
The computer burst upon the scene around 1950. With its unprecedented power
for analysis and dissemination of extremely varied kinds of data in unbelievable
quantities and at mind-staggering speeds, it has become a major force behind the
latest acceleration in knowledge acquisition....
... "Knowledge is change"-and accelerating knowledge-acquisition, fueling
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television to the Internet, has and will continue to influence the behavior of
legislators, chief executives, judges, and the law at both the domestic and
international levels.5 Although this development has received some attention, the
dramatic impact that technology could have on the balance between
countermajoritarian judicial power and majoritarian democratic power has not
been explored. And, despite the vital leadership role which elites must play if the
"difficulty" is to be resolved, many constitutional theorists tend to discuss
premises and conclusions through the use of convoluted arguments and nuanced
terminology, their target audience being other academics, judges, lawyers, and
law students6 (or perhaps only other academics), rather than the average
American citizen.
Blessed with a historically unprecedented level of communication technology
available even to those with modest financial resources,8 Americans are woefully
unaware of the part played by the judicial branch in drawing the boundaries of the
the great engine of technology, means accelerating change.
ALvIN TOFFLER, FUTURE SHOCK 28-29 (1970).
5. See Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Cyberspace and State Sovereignty, 3 J. INT'L LEGAL STUD.
155, 195 (1997) ("Because the Internet eases access to the channels of communication to...
world wide audiences, it fundamentally alters the balance of power between different political
actors.").
6. John Domino, former Director of Programs for the American Judicature Society,
observed that efforts to respond to attacks on judicial independence "have been in relative
isolation and directed at members of the legal profession as the primary audience." American
Bar Association, Public Hearings of the Commission on the Separation of Powers and Judicial
Independence 112 (Dec. 13, 1996) (statement of John C. Domino, Director of Programs,
American Judicature Society), available in American Bar Assoc. Gov't Affairs Office, An
Independent Judiciary: Report of the Commission on Separation of Powers and Judicial
Independence (visited on Nov. 16, 1998) <http://www.abanet.org/govaffairs/judiciary/
home.html>. Therefore, "until a coordinated national education campaign to promote judicial
independence is undertaken, overt as well as subtle but significant intrusions will continue to
erode independence and public confidence." Id. As always, there are exceptions. A recent book
by AKHIL REED AMAR & ALAN HIRSCH, FOR THE PEOPLE (1998), is one attempt to bring
constitutional law back down to the level of the lay reader and still offer new insights to the
accomplished scholar.
7. See Richard Posner, Against Constitutional Theory, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 4 (1998)
("[T]he real significance of constitutional theory is ... the increased academification of law
school professors, who are much more inclined than they used to be to write for other
professors rather than for judges and practitioners.").
8. In 1997 alone, the cost of home computers featuring the latest technology fell from
$1,200-2,300 to $700-1,400. See Jim Carlton, Cheaper PCs Start to Attract New Customers,
WALL ST. J., Jan. 26, 1998, at B8. The affordability of modem computers far superior in speed
and memory to even their recent ancestors presents a dramatic contrast to their original
counterparts. The birth of home computing occurred in 1960 when Digital Equipment Corp.
("DEC") introduced an alternative to mainframes costing millions of dollars with a desktop
version for a mere $120,000. See Evan Ramstad & Jon G. Auerbach, Compaq Buys Digital,
An Unthinkable Event Just a Few Year Ago, WALL ST. J., Jan. 27, 1998, at Al. By the late
1960s, the price of a DEC personal computer had fallen to $18,000. Although an impressive
six feet high and weighing 250 pounds, it had "less raw computing power than some
wristwatches do today." BILL GATES, THE ROAD AHEAD 11-12 (1995).
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public policy arena. In order to maintain its legitimacy, the judiciary9 must
communicate a coherent vision of its constitutional role to a public increasingly
empowered by the "electronic revolution."'0 In light of the recent efforts by
activist groups and some members of Congress to turn public opinion against
federal judges who, it is contended, have exceeded their constitutional authority,
it is imperative that legal minds articulate the roots of the judiciary's authority to
intervene in the democratic realm in a manner which is both persuasive and
comprehensible to a reasonably intelligent voter.
Previously, highly controversial Supreme Court decisions which ran counter to
majority preference rarely dwelt upon the countermajoritarian aspect of the
ruling." In Brown v. Board of Education,2 for example' a unanimous Court
simply applied its analysis that separate schooling of whites and blacks was
inherently unequal and did not address the "anti-democratic" or controversial
nature of its holding. 3 In Roe v. Wade,'4 the dissents, although vigorous, did not
openly question the legitimacy of the Court." Recently, as if to acknowledge the
forces of change in society, the debate between the Justices has intensified,
producing elaborate justifications, candid reflections, and bitter critiques of the
Court's use of its power and the sources from which that power is derived. 6
9. For the reasons of simplicity and focus, the scope of my discussion will be limited to
federal judges. Although state constitutions vary, state judges are often in a more precarious
position than federal judges, in part because they are usually subject to retention elections or
a similar electoral device. For an intensive examination of this "majoritarian difficulty," see
Steven P. Croley, The Majoritarian Difflculty: Elective Judiciaries and the Rule of Law, 62 U.
Cm. L. REV. 689 (1995).
10. A personal computer can be found in approximately 40% of the nation's households,
and some analysts believe the rate will exceed 50% within a few years. See Carlton, supra note
8, at B8.
11. The Court typically stands most united and issues its strongest language when its
authority is directly challenged. See, e.g., Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) ("[A]
permanent and indispensable feature of our constitutional system" is that"the federal judiciary
is supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution.").
12. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
13. The Justices were nevertheless keenly aware of the controversial nature of the case, and
fashioned the vague "with all deliberate speed" remedy accordingly. See DAVID M. O'BRIEN,
STORM CENT.ER: THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN POLmCS 350 (4th ed. 1996) ("As much
an apology for not setting precise guidelines as a recognition of the limitations of judicial
power, the phrase ['with all deliberate speed'] symbolized the Court's bold moral appeal to the
country."); see also WILLIAM SAFIRE, SAFHRE's NEW POLrrCAL DICTIONARY, 881-82 (1993)
(outlining the phrase's origin in history and literature).
14. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
15. "As an exercise of raw judicial power, the Court perhaps has authority to do what it
does today; but in my view its judgment is an improvident and extravagant exercise of the
power of judicial review that the Constitution extends to this Court." Id. at 222 (White, J.,
dissenting) (emphasis added). "While the opinion thus commands my respect, I find myself
nonetheless in fundamental disagreement with those parts of it that invalidate the Texas statute
in question, and therefore dissent." Id. at 171 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
16. The tone of the dissenting opinions on the topic are increasingly vitriolic. Justice Scalia
in particular has written scathing, sarcastical dissenting opinions challenging not only the
majority's reasoning, but the Court's legitimacy. For example, in the Virginia Military Institute
case, United States v. Virginia, Scalia declared:
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There is one decision which provides ample material for analyzing the nexus
of the countermajoritarian difficulty and the technological difficulty: the pivotal
1992 abortion case Planned Parenthood v. Casey.7 That decision offers the
opportunity to examine several aspects of the countermajoritarian difficulty: the
concept of stare decisis and whether public opinion should play a role in
overturning precedent; whether the Court should protect only those rights
enumerated in the Constitution and if not, the source of those rights; and how the
Court should communicate to the public its vision of the Constitution. 8
Part I of this Note provides a thumbnail sketch of the source of the
countermajoritarian difficulty and its treatment by academics. Although this
section is designed to provide background for the lay reader, observations which
may be of interest to those familiar with constitutional theory are included as
well. Part II reflects on the current social situation in the electronic age and
ascertains why the technologically driven trend towards majoritarianism requires
a reconfiguring of the calculus used in resolving the countermajoritarian difficulty
(if in fact it is resolvable). Thereafter, this Part surveys current activity by
Congress and activists to roll back judicial power. Two classic examples of anti-
judicial fever from bygone eras, Roosevelt's 1937 "court packing" plan and the
impeachment (and subsequent acquittal) of Supreme Court Justice Samuel Chase
at the beginning of the Nineteenth century, 9 suggest that such activity is not new.
A closer assessment, however, demonstrates that the political techniques have
[I]t is one of the unhappy incidents of the federal system that a self-righteous
Supreme Court, acting on its Members' personal view of what would make a
"more perfect Union," (a criterion only slightly more restrictive than a "more
perfect world"), can impose its own favored social and economic dispositions
nationwide.
United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 601 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citation omitted)
(parenthetical in original).
17. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). Many other recent decisions would be useful for analyzing the
countermajoritarian difficulty in this context In addition to Virginia, Boerne v. Flores, 117 S.
Ct. 2157 (1997), addressed in particular the question of whether the Court possesses the sole
authority to define the Bill of Rights as incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment; United
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), concerned the importance of findings and deference to
Congress, and what the Court's role should be in economic matters, particularly where
concerns of federalism are implicated; and Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996), like Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, considered whether tradition and morality of the majority sufficiently
outweigh the rights of a minority. Note that Casey, unlike most of these cases has received due
attention as to its antimajoritarian aspects. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW 117
(1996) ("[Casey] may prove to be one of the most important Court decisions of this generation
. .. because three key justices ... reaffirmed a more general view of the nature of the
Constitution which they had been appointed to help destroy.").
18. There is a danger that the use of the Casey decision as a vehicle for analyzing the Court,
given the controversial nature of the abortion issue, will obscure the central thesis of this Note.
That thesis is not ideological-scholars of all persuasions should be concerned about the effect
of technology on the judiciary. I will focus on Casey rather than the other decisions because
this decision offers the most substantive "dialogue" between the Justices.
19. See STERLING HARWOOD, JUDIcIAL AcTIvIsM: A RESTRAINED DEFENSE 24 (rev. ed.
1996); William H. Rehnquist, The Impeachment Clause: A Wild Card in the Constitution, 85
Nw. U. L. Rev. 903, 905-10 (1991).
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changed, that political structures designed to rein in democratic excess are
decaying, and that grass roots forces are more readily mobilizable now more than
ever.
Finally, Part III examines the Casey decision from two vantage points. First,
one must ask whether the decision is doctrinally sound. The controlling plurality
opinion in Casey (the "joint opinion") employed a pervasive pragmatism
throughout the opinion, yet strove to pay some allegiance to formalism. In other
words, the primary opinion in Casey reached its decision by candidly weighing
rather nonformalist factors (such as public opinion), yet attempted to justify its
opinion through reliance on a formalist (and sometimes contorted) view of history
and logic.
The second question is, given the rising majoritarianism, what does Casey say
about the Supreme Court's ability to command authority in America today when
adjudicating controversial cases? On one hand, the case is notable (even
admirable, perhaps) for its attempt to address a non-legal audience. Yet, by
attempting to communicate in a way which makes its opinions more accessible to
the layperson, the Court becomes more susceptible to criticism. At least in cases
touching on highly controversial public policy issues, "[t]he Court must take care
to speak and act in ways that allow people to accept its decisions... as grounded
truly in principle."2
I. THE COUNTERMAJORITARIAN DIFFICULTY REVISITED:
DEFINING THE ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY IN A MODERN
CONSTITUTIONAL REPUBLIC
Recognizing that only a judiciary truly independent of the legislative and
executive branches and isolated from the pressure exerted by the majority can
check the whims of majority will,21 the Founders placed the "rudder" of the
Constitution in the hands of the judicial branch pursuant to the judicial power
clause of Article III.' Following appointment by the President and confirmation
by the Senate,' federal judges retain their offices subject to digressions from
"good Behaviour."2 The congressional power to exercise control over the
20. Casey, 505 U.S. at 865. The Casey opinions are written in a manner more
understandable to a lay reader, and this change in style could be viewed as an effort by the
Justices to accommodate the reality of the rising majoritarianism.
21. "Mhe courts were designed to be an intermediate body between the people and the
legislature, in order, among other things, to keep the latter within the limits assigned to their
authority." THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 229 (Alexander Hamilton) (Roy P. Fairfield ed., Johns
Hopkins 2d ed. 1981).
22. "The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this
Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under
their Authority...." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
23. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
24. "The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during
good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation, which
shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
1999]
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treasury cannot violate the compensation clause, which forbids the reduction of
judicial salaries.25
The separation of powers doctrine bestows upon no branch the entitlement to
absolute independence. Therefore, the Constitution outlines what devices the
other branches may use to check assertions of judicial power: The President can
seek and nominate judges who share the chief executive's legal philosophy.26 The
House and Senate possess the respective powers to impeach and remove "all civil
officers" for committing "high crimes and misdemeanors."27 Congress also has
the power to establish or eliminate all federal courts below the Supreme Court"
and limit the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction. 9
Experience subsequent to the founding demonstrates that checks upon the
judiciary bark much louder than they bite. For perhaps political and institutional
reasons, proposals to blatantly exclude the judiciary from hearing specific legal
questions have failed even when political conditions appeared favorable.3
Likewise, the rare use ofjudicial impeachment3' reinforces Thomas Jefferson's
view that for the judiciary, impeachment is a "mere scare-crow."32 Finally, several
25. See id.
26. However, the President's discretion in appointing Supreme Court Justices will be
significantly narrowed if the Senate is controlled by the opposite party. See Terry Eastland,
Deactivate the Courts, AM. SPECTATOR, Mar. 1997, at 60 (arguing that had the Republicans
held the Senate longer or at least prevented the rejection of Robert Bork, Roe v. Wade would
have been overruled).
27. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.
28. The Supreme Court is the sole court expressly established by the Constitution. "The
judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior
Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish." U.S. CONsT. art. III, § I.
29. "[T]he supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with
such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make." U.S. CoNsT. art.
III, § 2, cl. 2.
30. Conservative Republicans attempted to capitalize on the election of President Ronald
Reagan by proposing measures which would have severely limited the ability of federal courts
to either issue injunctions or even hear cases addressing certain legal issues. See, e.g., H.R. 73,
97th Cong. (1981) (proposal to limit the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts in matters
relating to abortion); H.R. 865, 97th Cong. (1981) (limiting the jurisdiction of both the
Supreme Court and district courts in cases involving school prayer).
31. Congress has conducted 11 impeachment trials over 200 years, four of which ended in
acquittal. All five judges convicted in this century had, by the time of their removal, already
been convicted of a crime or were accused of activities which constituted crimes. See Warren
S. Grimes, Hundred-Ton-Gun Control: Preserving Impeachment as the Exclusive Removal
Mechanism for Federal Judges, 38 UCLAL. REV. 1209, 1214-15 (1991). See generally RAOUL
BERGER, IMPEACHMENT: THE CONsTrrUTIONAL PROBLEMS (1973), for a noteworthy
examination of the impeachment process.
32. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to T. Ritchie (1820), in THOMAS JEFFERSON ON
DEMOCRACY 63, 63 (Saul K. Padover ed., 8th prtg., Mentor Books 1961) (1939); see also
Transcript, The Goldwater Institute and the Federalist Society: Federalism and Judicial
Mandate, 28 ARiz. ST. L.J. 17,24 (1996) ("As President Jefferson was soon to discover when
his party attempted to remove Justice Samuel Chase from the Supreme Court, impeachment
was a 'farce,' 'not even a scare-crow."') (comments by Lino Graglia); id. at 97 ("The
impeachment authority is a hollow check on judicial power.") (comments by Fife Symington).
But see HARWOOD, supra note 19, at 24 ("Intimidating impeachments can be de facto
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Supreme Court Justices have surprised Presidents with judicial philosophies
which ran counter to what their appointers had in mind at the time of selection.33
Given that judicial elites appointed to the federal courts are as a practical
matter beyond the democratic process, the recurring dilemma raised by the
countermajoritarian difficulty is that judges, being human, will tend to
consciously or unconsciously prefer one political philosophy over another.
According to conventional wisdom, the injection of personal values into the
judicial decisionmaking process places select interest groups at a disadvantage
in the political process by disrupting a political arena where public opinion is said
to be influenced by the rulings of the Supreme Court.34 The evidence does not
support this conventional view, however.35 The far more troublesome implications
successful in controlling the court.").
33. After leaving office in 1961, President Dwight D. Eisenhower considered the
appointments of Justice William Brennan and Chief Justice Earl Warren to be among two of
his most prominent mistakes. See HARWOOD, supra note 19, at 23. Likewise, Justice Bryon
White, a Kennedy appointee, often voted with conservatives in criminal rights cases. See, e.g.,
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) (establishing a good-faith exception to the
exclusionary rule); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980) (upholding a recidivist statute
imposing a life sentence for three nonviolent criminal offenses involving a total of $229.11);
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 526-45 (1966) (White, J., dissenting) (objecting to the rule
for excluding improperly obtained evidence).
Similarly, George Bush, at the time of choosing David Souter to replace Justice Brennan,
desired a Justice who would practice "judicial restraint' and decide cases based upon the "intent
of the framers." Peter Parisi, Judicial Limitation, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 13, 1997, at A17. Widely
recognized as a disappointment to the Bush camp, Souter joins the opinions of Clinton
appointees Ginsburg and Breyer 62% of the time, and he co-authored the Casey joint opinion
reaffirming the "essential holding" of Roe v. Wade. See Joan Biskupic, The Supreme Court's
Balance ofPower, WASH. POST, July 3, 1997, at A17. Of course, determining whether Justice
Souter is in some fashion exercising "judicial restraint" depends upon one's definition of that
term. See RIcHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COuRTS 314 (1996) (outlining in detail five
different meanings of"judicial restraint"); see also American Bar Association, Public Hearing
of the Commission on the Separation of Powers and Judicial Independence, American Bar
Association 33-53 (Oct. 11, 1996) (statement of Prof. Stephen Burbank, University of
Pennsylvania Law School), available in American Bar Assoc. Gov't Affairs Office, An
Independent Judiciary Report of the Commission on Separation of Powers and Judicial
Independence (visited on Nov. 16, 1998) <http://www.abanet.org/govaffairs/judiciary/
home.html> [hereinafter Burbank]. "[Although] a normal and perfectly understandable part of
the political process," the practice of Presidents vetting their judicial appointments for
substantive policy positions should not be taken to an extreme. Id. at 41.
34. Justice Scalia opined in Casey that "Roe created a vast new class of abortion consumers
and abortion proponents by eliminating the moral opprobrium that had attached to the act. ('If
the Constitution guarantees abortion, how can it be bad?'-- not an accurate line of thought,
but a natural one.)" Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 995 (1992) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis and parenthetical in original).
35. Convening on the eve of Robert Dahl's 1957 path-breaking article, the political science
jury has since that time rendered the verdict that the Court does not influence public opinion,
but is still out on the issue of whether the public influences the Court. See Robert Dahli,
Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB.
L. 279, 293 (1957) ("By itself, the Court is almost powerless to affect the course of national
policy."); LEE EPSTEIN ET AL., THE SUPREME COURT COMPENDIJM 676 (2d ed. 1996) ("The
overwhelming majority of research ... has found the Court to be without power to influence
1999]
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ofjudicial decisionmaking executed with the conscious intention to advance an
ideological end is that the process becomes rather arbitrary, the result of a
somewhat "objective" written Constitution being displaced by the subjective
personal policy preferences of the judge. 6
The essential issue addressed by constitutional theorists is what methods for
disposing of cases and controversies are both workable and prudentially
acceptable for use in interpreting the Constitution. The proposed tools and
subsequent variations of those tools are now so numerous that the mere listing
and explanation of them presents a daunting task. The two competing theoretical
paradigms can roughly be broken down into "interpretivists" (also known as
"originalists" or "textualists") and "noninterpretivists.""
Originalist scholars, most notably Robert Bork38 and Raoul Berger 9 argue that
the interpretation of the Constitution should be consistent, to the greatest
practicable degree at least, with that of its authors. 0 Theorists of this persuasion
lament the fading acceptance of their tradition in the courts and a perceived bias
by those courts against their public policy preferences. Hoover Institution scholar
Thomas Sowell writes:
Constitutional right after constitutional right has been stretched far beyond
anything encompassed by those rights when they were written-but only
when the rights in question were consonant with the vision of the anointed.
Where a constitutional right goes counter to, or inhibits, some aspect of that
vision, that c6nstitutional right is far more likely to be reduced or
public opinion."); GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT
SOCIAL CHANGE? 338 (1991) ("U.S. Courts can almost never be effective producers of
significant social reform.") (emphasis in original). Nevertheless, the continuing success of
perception sans concrete evidence continues.
36. One would like to believe that resolution of constitutional issues can be commanded
by an objective truth emanating from the Constitution which awaits discovery by judges if they
will only have the integrity and intellect to discern its mysteries. Practical considerations of
constitutional interpretation suggest this is a faint hope, particularly when the document being
interpreted is more than 200 years old. Professor Chemerinsky writes: "The search for
determinacy is inherently futile.... The choice to have a constitution written in abstract,
general language-something that allows it to serve as a constitutive document-ensures that
choices must be made in giving specific content to individual provisions." ERWIN
CHEMERINSKY, INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION 110-11 (1987).
37. EDWARD F. HENNESSEY, JUDGES MAKING LAW 47 (1994).
38. ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 143 (1990) ("In truth, only the approach
of original understanding meets the criteria that any theory of constitutional adjudication must
meet in order to possess democratic legitimacy.").
39. Raoul Berger, "Original Intentions" in Historical Perspective, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REv.
296 (1986); see also THOMAS SOWELL, THE VISION OF THE ANOINTED 227-31 (1995)
(discussing the continuing relevance of originalism and the "gross distortion" of the theory by
its opponents).
40. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 1 (1980) (concluding that
interpretivism pledges that "judges deciding constitutional issues should confine themselves
to enforcing norms that are stated or clearly implicit in the written Constitution"); LEONARD
W. LEVY, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE FRAMERS' CONSTrrUTION at xv (1988) ("Generally an
interpretivist is one who believes that courts should stay as closely as possible to the text of the
Constitution, to original intent if ascertainable, to principles and purposes derived from the
Constitution, to history, and probably to precedents and conventional rules of construction.").
[Vol. 74:653
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ignored.... The selective indignation of the anointed is reflected in legal
theory that is selectively cosmic.4'
Sowell neglects many cases concerning issues of takings,42 race,43 and civil
rights44 which many commentators consider to be "conservative activism." Others
contend that the law maintains a decidedly right-of-center posture, or at least
favors elite interests at the expense of the disadvantaged. 4' Nevertheless, Sowell
41. SOWELL, supra note 39, at 223 (citing the double jeopardy aspect of prosecuting the
officers for both state criminal and federal civil rights laws in the Rodney King case and Fifth
Amendment property rights cases as examples of selective expansion of rights); see also Lino
A. Graglia, It's Not Constitutionalism, It's JudicialActivism, 19 IIARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 293,
298 (1996) ("[T]o fully understand contemporary constitutional law [one must know] that,
almost without exception, the effect of rulings of unconstitutionality over the past four decades
has been to enact the policy preferences of the cultural elite on the far left of the American
political spectrum."); William Kristol, The Judiciary: Conservatism's Lost Branch, 17 HARv.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 131, 133 (1994) ("[Mlembers of the cultural elite are overwhelmingly
liberal, and the lawyers populating the Supreme Court are part of that elite."). Kristol, however,
minimizes the consequences of this phenomenon: "Though judicial triumphs are helpful at the
margins, no substitute exists for real political victories.... The real battles over the most
contentious issues will be waged during presidential elections or before Congress and state
legislative bodies. They always are." Id at 134.
42. See, e.g., Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992); Nollan v.
California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987). Professor Hopperton contends that "in
Lucas Justice Scalia... produced perhaps the most activist opinion in the history of Supreme
Court land-use jurisprudence." Hopperton, supra note 1, at 550; cf. Molly S. McUsic, The
Ghost ofLochner: Modern Takings Doctrine and its Impact on Economic Legislation, 76 B.U.
L. REV. 605, 667 (1996) (concluding that although the Supreme Court has used the "tools of
the Lochner-era Court," it has limited this usage to takings, an area which is "far immune to
the forces of a national conservative electorate").
43. See Koteles Alexander, Adarand: Brute Political Force Concealed as a Constitutional
Colorblind Principle, 39 How. L.J. 367, 387 ("The Adarand majority's application of strict
scrutiny reflects political judgment rather than a doctrine influenced by a fidelity to federalism
and the rule of law."); Patricia A. Carlson, Recent Development, Adarand Constructors, Inc.
v. Pena: The Lochnerization ofAffirmative Action, 27 ST. MARY'S L.J. 423, 452 (1996) ("[Tihe
justices' substitution of their notions of individual rights and economic liberty for Congress's
judgment that minorities are socially and economically disadvantaged illuminates the Court's
Lochner-like preference for promoting individual rights at the expense of social rights without
regard to the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.").
44. See David Rudovsky, The Qualified Immunity Doctrine in the Supreme Court: Judicial
Activism and the Restriction of Constitutional Rights, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 23 passim (1989)
(asserting that the Supreme Court has unduly narrowed the availability of civil rights actions
by broadly construing qualified immunity).
45. Steven Loffredo writes that the Burger and Rehnquist Courts have
displayed exceptional sensitivity toward elite communicative modes such as
corporate campaign financing, corporate speech, large scale political expenditures
... [while simultaneously being] markedly inhospitable toward distinctively
plebeian modes of political expression and participation, like the public display
of posters, picketing, residential distribution of handbills and demonstrations in
public parks.
Stephen Loffredo, Poverty, Democracy and Constitutional Law, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1277,
1364-65 (1993). Likewise, defense attorney Gerry Spence, a veteran of many a battle with
insurance companies and the government, perceives a manifestly different, yet equally sinister
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is correct that on balance "conservative" policy positions have suffered the court-
imposed stigma of unconstitutionality more than "liberal" positions.46
In contrast to interpretivists, noninterpretivist scholars tend to base their
method on contemporary values not necessarily found in the text or history of the
Constitution,47 but grounded in fundamental principles of justice and morality.
Nonoriginalists such as noninterpretivists Lawrence Tribe,48 Ronald Dworkin,49
and Michael Perry,"0 and libertarian natural rights theorists,"' reflect the diversity
of the academic landscape, their primary points of agreement being most often
related to the stalwart opinion that the originalist approach is a thoroughly
discredited school of thought.52 Anti-originalists generally maintain that strict
corporate oligarchy commanding the elites in black robes: "Our judges, with glaring exceptions
known to all, loyally serve the New King, the corporate core, whose money and influence are
responsible for their office. They are not bad people [but] they faithfully serve the law and,
accordingly, the King." GERRY SPENCE, FROM FREEDOM TO SLAVERY 52 (1993).
46. Although the reader will understand in a general sense the policy positions I allude to
here, I place quotation marks around the terms "liberal" and "conservative," because, like the
distinction between political "left" and "right," its utility as a precise descriptive device is
nearly nonexistent.
47. See ELY, supra note 40, at I (Noninterpretivism proposes that "courts should go beyond
[the constitutional text] and enforce norms that cannot be discovered within the four comers
of the document.").
48. Professor Tribe could be termed a "moderate" noninterpretivist because although he
flatly dismissed originalism as "one way not to read the Constitution," he also rejects radical
nonoriginalist interpretations such as Professor Mark Tushnet's view that "we ought to read
the Constitution as requiring socialism." LAURENCE H. TRIBE & MICHAEL C. DORF, ON
READING THE CONSTITUTION 20, 22 (1991).
49. Professor Dworkin endorses a "moral reading" of the Constitution which "proposes that
we all--judges, lawyers, citizens-interpret and apply these abstract clauses [such as the First
Amendment] on the understanding that they invoke moral principles about political decency
and justice." DWORK]N, supra note 17, at 2.
50. Michael J. Perry, The Legitimacy of Particular Conceptions of Constitutional
Interpretation, 77 VA. L. REV. 669 (1991).
51. Although I have grouped libertarian theorists with noninterpretivists for the
convenience of drawing a contrast with the interpretivists, a precise parsing of the two is as
follows:
The distinction is between a progressive belief in a discernable but evolving list
of fundamental rights and a libertarian belief that the only essential rights are
those directly related to the free market economy. For the former, social
engineering, particularly by the judiciary, is an artform to be promoted and
perfected; for the latter it is anathema.
Allan Ides, The American Democracy and Judicial Review, 33 ARIZ. L. REV. 1, 27 (1991).
Therefore, unlike most noninterpretivist scholars, who relegate property rights to the back of
the constitutional bus, libertarian natural rights theorists reject what they see as both the
unworkable framework of originalism and the false dichotomy between personal liberty and
property rights. See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER
OF EMINENT DOMAIN (1985); STEPHEN MACEDO, THE NEW RIGHT V. THE CONSTITUTION 60
(1987) (noting "the failure ofjudges on the right and the left carefully to examine the reasons
supporting restrictions on individual liberty, whether economic or personal").
52. Yale law professor Stephen Carter, who, as a defender of abortion rights and a strong
supporter of Anita Hill, cannot easily be tagged with the "conservative" ideological label,
professes that "my constitutional law scholarship... has consistently adhered to a vision of the
(Vol. 74:653
JUDICIAL INTERVENTION
adherence to the original intentions of the framers, to the extent that such
inclinations are even verifiable, would freeze rights and liberties at a particular
point in history and entail consequences which the public would never accept.53
Professor Erwin Chemerinsky even implies that if originalists properly applied
their own theory, they would advocate noninterpretivism:
An examination of the Framers' jurisprudence... supports the view that
they expected the meaning of the Constitution to evolve.... The Framers did
not see it as necessary to enumerate the rights they believed to be natural[,]..
. [but rather] that courts would articulate natural law principles in the process
of deciding cases.... Thus, the Constitution's protection of natural rights
was intentionally left vague, and it was knowingly left to the judiciary to
specify the particular meaning of the rights. 4
Given that these approaches to constitutional interpretation are fundamentally
at odds, the basic legitimacy and intellectual integrity of the opposing theory is
often called into question. Robert Bork takes the dark view that strategically-
speaking, it is beneficial for modem constitutional theorists that their works are
generally not read by the nonlegal community:
Although it is unlikely that many persons outside the academy are even aware
of this literature's existence, much less its content, that does not mean it [has
no effect on judges]. Its very inaccessibility may, paradoxically, be a source
of its influence. Because the public at large and the legal profession as a
whole are unaware of what is being taught and written, the reaction of
ridicule and hostility that might have been expected has not been
forthcoming.55
Stephen Presser goes even further, declaring: "Most current constitutional theory,
so complex as to be virtually impenetrable, is, at bottom, a rather shameless
attempt to legitimate what ought properly to be regarded as the blatantly
original understanding as the basis for constitutional adjudication, a claim that is practically
anathema among serious legal theorists, most of whom come from the Left." STEPHEN L.
CARTER, REFLECTIONS OF AN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION BABY 146-47 (1991).
53. Professor Sunstein provides an adequate parade of horribles:
The consequences of [Bork's originalism] are not obscure. There is no right
of privacy.... [D]iscrimination on the basis of gender, or on almost any other
basis, is likely to be upheld .... Poll taxes are permissible, as are violations of the
principle of one person-one vote.... Compulsory sterilization of some criminals
would be acceptable. Many federal programs of the New Deal period and after
would be unconstitutional.
CASS R SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION 97 (1993).
54. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 36, at 62. See generally JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL
MEANINGS (1996). For an originalist response to Rakove, see Raoul Berger, Jack Rakove's
Rendition of Original Meaning, 72 IND. L.J. 619 (1997).
55. BORK, supra note 38, at 135; accord CHRISTOPHER WOLFE, JUDICIAL ACTIVISM:
BULWARK OF FREEDOM ORPRECARIOUS SEcuRrrV? 127 (1991) ("If ordinary citizens come to
see more clearly how lawyers and judges understand judicial power, then the foundations of
modem judicial power could become shaky."). For his condemnati6n of nonoriginalist writing,
Bork has won the contempt of such authors. See, e.g., DWORKIN, supra note 17, at 302-03
("Some other conservative legal scholar might succeed further with the idea of an original
understanding than Bork has. But until someone does we are entitled, on the evidence of [The
Tempting of.America], to store the theory away with phlogistonism and the bogeyman.").
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unconstitutional decisions of the Supreme Court of the past sixty years. .... ,56 If
shameful obfuscation is in fact the modus operandi of modem constitutional
theory, it will be interesting to see whether the non-legal community eventually
learns of this "shameless" scholarship via information technology and what
impact this knowledge will have on the power of academics and judges.
Combatants in the noninterpretism-versus-originalism debate tend to avoid the
question of whether attempting to resolve the dilemma through judicial
interpretation alone is futile. As nonoriginalist Paul Brest has conceded, "no
defensible criteria exist" to "assess theories of judicial review '57 and therefore
"the Madisonian dilemma is in fact unresolvable."
58
Thomas Jefferson's writings illustrate the current constitutional tension that
partially vindicates the views of both theoretical factions. On one hand, he sounds
like an originalist:
On every question of construction, carry ourselves back to the time when the
Constitution was adopted, recollect the spirit manifested in the debates, and
instead of trying what meaning may be squeezed out of the text, or invented
against it, conform to the probable one in which it was passed.5,
On the other hand, despite Jefferson's "endorsement" of the original intent brand
of constitutional interpretation, he may not have anticipated a constitution older
than twenty years, much less that many decades. In an 1816 letter to Samuel
Kercheval, Jefferson acknowledged:
[L]aws and institutions must go hand in hand with the progress of the human
mind.... As new discoveries are made, new truths disclosed, and manners
and opinions change with the change of circumstances, institutions must
advance also, and keep pace with the times.... Each generation ... has a
right to choose for itself the form of government it believes the most
promotive of its own happiness.... A solemn opportunity of doing this every
19 or 20 years should be provided by the constitution.60
56. ST mEN B. PRESSER, RECAPTURING THE CONSTITuTION 4 (1994) (footnote omitted).
57. Paul Brest, The Fundamental Rights Controversy: The Essential Contradictions of
Normative Constitutional Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1063, 1065 (1981).
58. 1d. at 1097.
59. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Judge William Johnson (June 12, 1823), in 15 THE
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 439, 449 (Andrew A. Lipscomb & Albert E. Bergh eds.,
1904). This quotation and countless others from Jefferson and other Founders can also be
found on the Internet. See e.g., Thomas Jefferson on Politics and Government (visited Sept.
28, 1998) <http://etextvirginia.edu/jefferson/quotations/> (letter written to William Johnson,
1823). Although Jefferson displays a "strict constructionist" tendency here, this attitude might
extend only to Article I powers and therefore "his overall theory of constitutional interpretation
is less easily pigeonholed." David N. Mayer, Justice Clarence Thomas and the Supreme
Court's Rediscovery of the Tenth Amendment, 25 CAP. U. L. REV. 339, 423 n.46 (1996).
60. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to S. Kercheval (1816), in THOMAS JEFFERSON ON
DEMOCRACY, supra note 32, at 67 (first, third, and fourth omission in original). Jefferson
believed that one generation cannot bind the next, and therefore each generation must expressly
consent to the old constitution, or draft a new one if the old document is found to be
inadequate. Because more than half of those individuals 21 years of age and older at the time
of a constitution's adoption would thereafter die within 18 years and eight months, Jefferson
determined the optimal interval for drafting a constitution to be every 20 years. Given the
increase in life expectancy since the late eighteenth century, the appropriate interval today
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In sum, while mandating adherence to the original understanding of our
foundational legal document may be the only reliable way to effect the
simultaneous goals ofjudicial restraint and majority constraint, the fundamental
problem is that social conditions change, new definitions of liberty develop, and,
with the passage of 210 years, "[j]ust what our forefathers did envision, or would
have envisioned had they foreseen modem conditions, must be divined from
materials almost as enigmatic as the dreams Joseph was called upon to interpret
for Pharaoh.""'
Jefferson undoubtedly would have contended, however, that each generation's
choice of government would be made by the masses rather than the judiciary.62
Nevertheless, given the population's lack of experience with the current
constitution63 as well as the instability such a dramatic change would bring in a
fast-paced and increasingly interdependent world, a constitutional convention
every fifty years does not appear feasible or prudent.' Likewise, altering the
meaning of the Constitution piecemeal through the Article V constitutional
amendment process65 has proved to be a frustrating experience, and nearly
unworkable in the face of institutional forces resistant to a dramatic disruption of
the status quo.66 Rexford Tugwell observed:
A serious difficulty with any agreement embodied in a document and
widely accepted, as the Constitution of 1787 eventually came to be, is that its
provisions eventually tend to become scriptural and that those who have an
would be closer to 40 years. See WILLIAM J. QuIRK & R RANDALL BRIDWELL, JUDICIAL
DICTATORSwP 69-70 (1995).
61. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
62. Although Jefferson in 1787 might have given judges some leeway, by the early 19th
century he was clearly discontented with the route the independent judiciary had taken. For
example, in 1820 Jefferson wrote to a certain William Jarvis that "[tjo consider the judges as
the ultimate arbiters of all constitutional questions [is] a very dangerous doctrine indeed, and
one which would place us under the despotism of an oligarchy." Letter from Thomas Jefferson
to Jarvis (1820), in THOMAS JEFFERSON ON DEMOCRACY, supra note 32, at 64 (second
alteration in original).
63. See discussion infra Part II.A.
64. The public must also be prepared to trust the current leadership of the United States to
write a document guaranteeing as much or more freedom than that currently possessed by
Americans.
65. Although the states have the power to initiate the amendment process, all 27
amendments were proposed in Congress. To be successfully ratified, a proposed amendment
must pass both houses of Congress by a two-thirds vote and thereafter be ratified by three-
fourths of the state legislatures. See U.S. CONST. art. V.
66. Of the thousands of constitutional amendments proposed between 1790 and the present
day, only 17 became part of the Constitution. The increasing number of proposed amendments
in recent years demonstrates a heightened dissatisfaction with the current document. For
criticism of this increased tendency to propose constitutional amendments, see John Conyers,
Jr., Is the United States Constitution a "Rough Draft"? An Open Letter to the 105th Congress,
6 WIDENER J. PuB. L. 323 (1997), and Kathleen M. Sullivan, ConstitutionalAmendmentitis,
AM. PROSPECT, Fall 1995, at 20.
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advantage under its provisions, and so have an interest in its perpetuation, are
able to organize active protection for its provisions.6'
Because the legislative and executive branches are as a practical matter unable
to alter the foundational document, the fate of the Republic has by default fallen
into the hands ofjudges. Chance and circumstance thus return one full circle back
to the countermajoritarian difficulty, which is primarily concerned with one
question: How can a court conduct its constitutional duty to secure core
constitutional rights and structural principles, which may necessitate striking
down popularly enacted legislation, and simultaneously maintain its legitimacy
as a counter-democratic force? Political legitimacy is the touchstone of an
independent judiciary.68 However, academics often focus on "theoretical" or
"actual" legitimacy; that is, whether the theory at hand solves the legal problem
in the minds of a majority of legal scholars. The more pressing concern is one of
"perceived" legitimacy. 69 Even where an exercise of power is in a theoretical
sense justifiable (or even the undoubtedly correct conclusion), if the politicians
or citizens simply perceive the judiciary to be exceeding its constitutional
mandate, the countermajoritarian difficulty remains unresolved.7" In the following
pages I hope to demonstrate that judges need and deserve guides more practical
than the prevalent esoteric plunges into constitutional theory if the judiciary's
historical role in American society is to be preserved.
67. REXFORD G. TUGWELL, THE EMERGING CONSTITUTION at xv (1974).
68. "The Court's power lies ... in its legitimacy, a product of substance and perception that
shows itself in the people's acceptance of the Judiciary as fit to determine what the Nation's
law means and to declare what it demands." Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 865
(1992).
69. See, e.g., Leslie Gielow Jacobs, Even More Honest Than Ever Before: Abandoning
Pretense and Recreating Legitimacy in Constitutional Interpretation, 1995 U. ILL. L. REV.,
363, 370 (describing a second type of legitimacy relying upon "general public perception").
70. Some scholars have argued, with considerable evidentiary support, that the premise that
the Court is antimajoritarian is in fact a faulty one and therefore the countermajoritarian
difficulty does not in fact exist. See Barry Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 MICH.
L. REV. 577, 581 (1993). But even if one concedes the validity of this proposition, the
perception of an anti-democratic Court persists. Hence, the difficulty remains unresolved.
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II. THE ELECTRONIC REPUBLIC: A THREAT TO JUDICIAL
INDEPENDENCE?
A. A Tale of Two Cities: Technological Progression and
Republican Decline
Technology is expanding at an unprecedented rate.7 The advances in
communications technology are profoundly affecting the manner in which people
receive information regarding national events and how they view their civic role
in modern American society. The former president of the Public Broadcasting
System, Lawrence Grossman, sees the emergence of an "Electronic Republic" as
"a revolution that is transforming our entire system of government before our
very eyes."'72
The dramatic advance in technology provides the conscientious citizen with an
unprecedented ability to access large quantities of information or to communicate
with others.7' Due to a relatively recent ability to travel long distances in a brief
amount of time to appear in person, to communicate information instantaneously
over the airwaves via satellite, or to hold "townhall meetings" over the Internet,
members of Congress are in contact with their constituents far more often and in
more ways than the Founders could have dreamed. 74 Both houses of Congress, as
71. In 1965, Intel co-founder Gordon Moore began issuing predictions regarding the
amount of information storable in a single silicon computer chip. Today, the principle known
as Moore's Law holds that the capacity of a silicon computer chip can be expected to double
every 18 months. If this extraordinary rate of expansion continues for the next 20 years, a
computation currently requiring an entire day of processing will be completed in fewer than
10 seconds. See GATES, supra note 8, at 31, 33.
72. Lawrence K. Grossman, Reshaping Political Values in the Information Age: The Power
of the Media, VITAL SPEECHES, Jan. 15, 1997, at 205, 205.
73. Access to the Internet for those of modest means may not even require an investment
in computer hardware, due to the installation of web-linked computers in public libraries, in
classrooms, and even in fast food restaurants and truck stops. In July of 1998, a Burger King
restaurant in New York City began offering 20 minutes of Internet time with a minimum
purchase. See Michel Marriott, New 'Combo'Meal: Dine andSurf, N.Y. TIMEs, July 30, 1998,
at D3.
74. In a historical moment that illustrates the power of the new technology, the House of
Representatives on September 11, 1998 at 2 p.m. EST placed the 445-page report from the
Office of Independent Counsel on the Internet, making it simultaneously available to the
American people, members of Congress, and the President. See Referral to the United States
House ofRepresentatives Pursuant o Title 28, United States Code, § 595(c), Submitted by the
Office of the Independent Counsel September 9, 1998 (visited Jan. 29, 1999)
<http'//icreportloc.gov/icreport/lcover.htm>. Millions of Americans with the means to access
the Internet were efficiently and inexpensively given the opportunity to fully inform themselves
of a matter of great national concern and thus were in a better position to advise their
representatives on what course the Congress should take.
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well as the President, maintain web pages. 7' Furthermore, most members of
Congress have their own personal web pages in order to better communicate with
their constituents, 76 as do all of the leadership offices 7' and committees. 71
Likewise, every executive department, from the Internal Revenue Service to the
Environmental Protection Agency, operates its own web page.79
Unremarkably, given the prohibition of television cameras in its courtroom, 80
the Supreme Court does not have a web page, nor do any of the Justices maintain
75. The Senate and House web sites can be found respectively at The United States Senate
(visited Nov. 4, 1998) <http://www.senate.gov>, and U.S. House of Representatives (visited
Nov. 4, 1998) <http://www.house.gov>. The Library of Congress provides an extensive amount
of legislative material at its "Thomas" web page, see Thomas: US. Congress on the Internet
(visited Jan. 23, 1999) <http://thomas.loc.govt>, and Cornell Law School's Legal Information
Institute maintains a searchable version of the United States Code, see United States Code
(visited Sept. 28, 1998) <http://fatty.law.comell.edu/uscode/index.html>. The President can
be reached at Welcome to the White House (visited Nov. 4, 1998) <http://www.whitehouse
.gov/WH/Welcome.html>.
76. For reasons of "security" and a bit of formality, most members of Congress only
respond by "snail mail" to e-mail messages from constituents. The degree to which the
transition from letters, phone calls, and faxes to e-mail will alter legislator-constituent relations
remains to be seen (particularly given the fact that an e-mail message entails no significant
cost). See Bill McAllister, Internet is Finding a Home on the Hill, WASH. PosT, Feb. 17, 1998,
at A13; J. Scott Orr, E-mail to Hill: Hello? Hello? Some Lawmakers Prove to be Offline, STAR-
LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), Sept. 8, 1998, at 1, available in 1998 WL 16957702; Nancy E.
Roman, How Much Clout Does E-mail Have in Congress?, WASH. TIMES, June 8, 1998, at
A10.
77. For example, the Speaker's Office is located at Speaker News (visited Nov. 4, 1998)
<http://speakemews.house.gov>. For a listing of links for majority and minority leadership
offices in the House of Representatives, such as the House Whip, see The US. House of
Representatives House Leadership Web Services (visited Nov. 4, 1998) <http://www.house.gov
/orgspub hseldrwww.html>.
78. The official Senate committee sites provide such information as the text of pending
bills, committee reports, and veto/signature information. See Senate Committees (visited Nov.
4, 1998) <http://www.senate.gov/committee/committee.html>, for a list of links to the
respective web sites.
79. The Library of Congress offers connections to all of the executive branch offices,
departments, and independent agencies. See Official Federal Government Web Sites (visited
Nov. 4, 1998) <http://Icweb.loc.gov/global/executivefed.html>. The quantity and quality of
information at each site varies from the standard contact information and explanation of
purposes, for example, the Coast Guard home page, see U.S. Coast Guard Pacific Northwest
Region (visited Nov. 4, 1998) <http://www.webcom.com/-dl3www/welcome.html>, to the
Envtl. Protection Agency's impressive offering in adobe photographic format of nearly all of
the Code of Federal Regulations sections pertaining to environmental law, see United States
Environmental Protection Agency, Laws & Regulations (visited Jan. 28, 1999)
<http://www.epa.gov/ epahome/rules.html>.
80. Some Justices on the Court vociferously object to the idea of cameras intruding on the
work of the Supreme Court. Citing his concern that ajudge's questioning or a lawyer's reply
during oral argument might be reduced to a sound bite, Justice David Souter offered a
memorable sound bite to the press: "The day you see a camera come into our courtroom it's
going to roll over my dead body." David Hatch, Cameras in Court: House Panel Moves on
Proposal, ELECTRONiC MEDIA, Mar. 16, 1998, at 38.
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personal web pages."' Nevertheless, the Court embraces technology when its use
will not compromise institutional integrity.82 In addition, several organizations
unaffiliated with the government supply numerous full-text Supreme Court
decisions over the Internet.83 Moreover, some court materials of public interest
that are otherwise relatively difficult or cumbersome to obtain are regularly
posted on the Internet, 4 sometimes even at very the moment they are released.8 5
Unfortunately, the fast pace at which new technological capabilities move
information has led the President and members of Congress to employ the use of
sound-bite saturated news conferences86 and emotionally laden public relations
81. The Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts does maintain a site on behalf of the
Federal Courts. See The Federal Judiciary Home Page (visited Nov. 4, 1998)
<http://www.uscourts.gov>. In addition, at least two web sites are dedicated solely to the task
of honoring Justice Scalia. See Cult of Scalia (visited Nov. 4,1998) <http://members.aol.com/
schwenkler/scalia/index.htm>, which refers to the Justice as "perhaps the greatest jurist of our
time," and The Scalia Shrine (visited Nov. 4, 1998) <http://student-www.uchicago.edu/
usersljfinitche/scalia>. No other Justices on the Supreme Court are currently being "honored"
with unofficial web pages.
82. The Supreme Court did not reject the first brief ever filed with the Court on CD-ROM
in February 1997. The brief was an amicus curiae filed by a Philadelphia law firm in
connection with the Internet free speech case, Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997). See
Martha Woodall, Supreme Court Invited to Go Digital, NEws & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.),
Feb. 22, 1997, at A9. However, the Supreme Court did not officially accept the CD-ROM
version of the brief either, relying instead on the paper version. In July of the same year, the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in a patent case, In re Berg, 140 F.3d 1428
(1998), became the first federal court to officially accept a CD-ROM submission. See M.A.
Stapleton, 1st Brief on CD-ROM Finds Favor with U.S. Appeals Court, CHI. DAILY L. BULL.,
July 30, 1997, at 1.
83. Comell Law School's Legal Information Institute offers the texts of all Supreme Court
decisions since 1990, as well as the full text of a large number of historical decisions prior to
1990 accessible by the Internet user's choice of topic, party name, or opinion author. See
Comell Law School, Welcome to the Legal Information Institute (visited Nov. 4, 1998)
<http://www.law.comell.edu>.
84. For example, the State Tobacco Information Center provides the text of (quite lengthy)
complaints filed by Attorneys General in the ongoing tobacco litigation. See, e.g., State of
Oklahoma v. RJ Reynolds et. al. Original Complaint (visited Nov. 4, 1998)
<http:llstic.neu.edu/OkOKcomplaint.html>.
85. A striking example is the heavily-publicized trial of English nanny Louise Woodward
in which Massachusetts Judge Hiller Zobel released his opinion exclusively via the Internet.
See Au Pair Trial Decision (visited Nov. 4, 1998) <http://www.lawyersweekly.com/
woodward.htm>. The placing of court decisions on the Internet at the time of announcement
is an encouraging development for it facilitates free, immediate access to judicial
pronouncements unfiltered by the media.
86. A "sound bite" that typically commanded 42.2 seconds of a viewer's attention during
the 1968 presidential campaign had, by the 1988 Presidential race, shrunk to a thin 9.8 seconds.
See PAUL TAYLOR, SEE How THEY RUN 258 (1990). Despite the paucity of information they
convey, sound bites effectively communicate information in a manner more likely to be
remembered by an often distracted and uninterested public. The Medicare debate presents a
textbook example. President Clinton and Congressional Democrats hammered the Republicans
with deftly executed sound bites in commercials throughout the 1996 Presidential campaign.
The Democrats were so effective in characterizing the Republicans as Medicare-cutters that
while a great deal of the people polled by the Washington Post could not name even one
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events in an attempt to assay the whims of a finicky electorate which in 1994
dramatically handed the Republican party both houses of Congress and yet by
1996 had turned the architect of the Republican "Revolution" into the bogeyman
of American politics.8 7 The model of the independent legislator, who comes to a
conclusion based upon what she believes to be the best outcome even though her
position may sometimes conflict with the opinions of previously unpollable or
less-knowledgeable constituents, has in large part given way to the democratic
legislator model. When faced with the prospect of voting against popular
legislation, Congress has at times abdicated its responsibility to consider the
constitutionality of its Acts, leaving to the courts the task of burying the ill-fated
statutes.8 8
Yet despite the enhanced ability to communicate their views to their
representatives and evaluate her or his performance, a large majority of
Americans are deeply dissatisfied and darkly cynical about their government.8 9
Senator from their state (54%) or the gender of their representative (25%), an "impressive"
69% knew that the Republicans were proposing larger "cuts" in Medicare than the Democrats.
See Richard Morin, Who's in Control? Many Don't Know or Care, WASH. PosT, Jan. 29, 1996,
at A6. Successful political tactics aside, debate by bumpersticker-like slogans does not make
a deliberative democracy.
87. Newt Gingrich's approval rating sunk as low as 25% prior to his departure from the
House following the 1998 congressional elections. See Gingrich's Popularity Plummets
(visited Nov. 30, 1998) <http://cnn.com/ALLPOLITICS/1997/03/29/newt.future/index.html>.
However, Republicans concerned that Gingrich's popularity derailed the legislative agenda he
made possible can take solace in the fact that only 53% of Americans polled in a January 1996
Washington Post poll knew Gingrich was the Speaker of the House. See Morin, supra note 86,
at A6.
88. In 1996, Congress passed the Communications Decency Act which sought to prohibit
"patently offensive" and "indecent" material transmitted over the Internet. 47 U.S.C.A.
§ 223(a), (d) (West Supp. 1998). Few observers seriously believed that the Act, which extended
beyond "unprotected" speech such as obscenity, could survive the strict examination required
of content-based speech regulations. See Hands Off the Internet, The Issue: Supreme Court
Takes Up Communications Decency Act, Our View: It's Plainly Unconstitutional-We Hope,
ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, Mar. 21, 1997, at 56A, available in 1997 WL 6826747; New
Cyberporn Law Is Far Too Restrictive, TENNESSEAN, Mar. 23, 1997, at 4D, available in 1997
WL 10092683. See generally R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) (striking down
a content-based hate speech ordinance using a strict scrutiny-like analysis). Nevertheless,
Congress passed the Act by wide margins. See 142 CONG. REC., S720 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 1996)
(conference report passing in the Senate by a vote of 91-5 with three absent). The Supreme
Court responded by unanimously striking the law down on vagueness grounds. See Reno v.
ACLU, 117 S. CL 2329, 2346 (1997). Likewise, Congress passed the fated Gun-Free School
Zones Act and Religious Freedom Restoration Act with little or no consideration of the
constitutionality of its actions. See generally United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995); City
of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
89. In January 1997, an astounding 75% of Afnericans polled agreed that ethical violations
are typical of most politicians. See CNN/USA TODA Y/Gallup Poll-January 6, 1997 (visited
Jan. 27, 1999) <http:llallpolitics.com/1997/0l/06/gingrich.poll/poll.html> (conducted Jan. 3-5,
1997); see also SUSAN J. TOLCHIN, THE ANGRY AMERICAN: How VOTER RAGE IS CHANGING
THENATION 9, 108 (1996) (citing polling data showing a tremendous drop in public confidence
in governmental institutions since 1964). Much of the declining confidence in government has
been attributed to unsettling historical developments such as Watergate, Vietnam, oil shortages,
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Canadian media observer Marshall Mcluhan notes that "as the speed of
information increases, the tendency for politics is to move away from
representation and delegation of constituents, toward immediate involvement of
the entire community in the central acts of decision." 9 Furthermore, this
technologically empowered majority, having lost faith in its elected leaders,
increasingly seeks to circumvent or limit the power of its congressional
representatives and advance majoritarian causes through such devices as
statewide ballot initiatives9' and term limits proposals.92 Finally, the 1992
candidacy of Ross Perot highlighted the fact that the two-party system fails to
sufficiently reflect the policy preferences of many Americans. 93
An unfortunate aspect of the pervasive cynicism is that it primarily derives from
factually exiguous impressions rather than healthy skepticism which endeavors
to inform itself of current events. Individuals today are generally busy,
distracted,94 uninterested in political affairs, and overwhelmed by the amount of
information available to them.95 Large portions of the population have neglected
their civic duties by lapsing into ignorance of even the most basic facts
concerning our system of government, a republican constitutional democracy.96
and adverse economic conditions. See TAYLOR, supra note 86, at 226. Others have argued that:
The expansion of the role of government has especially increased the number
of policy issues addressed by government and, in many instances, the number of
outcomes each issue may have. The result has been a decline in voter ability to
express preferences by voting. This has produced a decline in voter turnout,
increased voter apathy and alienation and, in some instances, a rise in the power
of single-issue interest groups as a method of expressing at least the most salient
of a voter's preference.
MARCIA LYNN WHICKER Er AL., THE CONSTITUTION UNDER PRESSURE 145 (1987); ef
SUZANNE GARMENT, SCANDAL: THE CULTURE OF MISTRUST IN AMERICAN POLITICS (1991)
(documenting a dramatic rise in the number of political scandals and their corrosive effect on
government).
90. Grossman, supra note 72, at 206.
91. See infra text accompanying notes 123-26.
92. In February 1997, the latest vote in the House of Representatives on a constitutional
amendment to impose term limits on members of Congress fell 69 votes short. The measure
drew fewer votes than on earlier occasions due in part to disagreement on the pro-term limit
side as to the appropriate number of terms. See House Rejects Bill to Impose Term Limits,
INTELLIGENCER J. (Lancaster, Pa.), Feb. 13, 1997, at Al.
93. See generally CAROLYN BARTA, PEROT AND HIS PEOPLE: DISRUPTING THE BALANCE OF
POLITICAL POWER (1993).
94. Grossman notes that the republican model of the past where politics provided the
"centerpiece of the nation's outdoor social and community life" has been "replaced by
television's endless diversions and amusements, [and] the nonstop availability of nonpolitical
entertainment and sports to occupy our time and distract us from reality." Grossman, supra note
72, at 207.
95. See TOFFLER, supra note 4, at 301-05 (discussing how the "information overload"
encountered in modem society leads to "cognitive overstimulation" adversely affecting an
individual's ability to "make effective, rational decisions").
96. In a Washington Post poll, 54% could not name even one senator from their state; 67%
could not identify the congressional representative from their district; a paltry 34% correctly
answered that Bob Dole was the Senate Majority Leader, even though Dole was then wrapping
up a presidential nomination; and, somewhat supporting the validity of John Nance Gamer's
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Indeed, the current state of affairs augments the wisdom of the Founders in
establishing a system of government which restrains the passions and whims of
the majority.9 7
Moreover, the electorate's lack of knowledge concerning the judicial branch
suggests that the Supreme Court is, for the moment, still well-sheltered from the
heat of public opinion." Little over half know of the Court's central function as
the final authority99 on whether a law is constitutional.' 0 Prior to his presiding
over the Clinton impeachment proceeding in the Senate, only a minuscule 6%
could correctly identify the current Chief Justice.'' A recent poll conducted by
the National Constitutional Center found that 40% of those interviewed did not
realize there are three branches of government,0 2 and 25% could not name any
of the rights guaranteed by the First Amendment.0 3
observation that the vice presidency is "not worth a pitcher of warm spit," 40% failed to
correctly identify the Vice President. Morin, supra note 86, at A6. Despite these uncomfortable
statistics, it is important to note that the American public is not a single, easily definable mass.
The polls do not accurately reflect the knowledge and fervor of the relatively few activists who
nevertheless have a disproportionate impact on public policy and public opinion.
97. In The Federalist No. 78, Hamilton wrote:
This independence of the judges is equally requisite to" guard the Constitution
and the rights of individuals from the effects of those ill humors, which the arts
of designing men or the influence of particular conjunctures sometimes
disseminate among the people themselves; and which, though they speedily give
place to better information and more deliberate reflection, have a tendency, in the
meantime, to occasion dangerous innovations in the government, and serious
oppressions of the minor party in the community.
THE FEDERALIST No. 78, supra note 21, at 231.
98. One scenario holds that due to their ignorance, citizens will be unable to properly assess
the charges against the judiciary made by those with ulterior motives and a propensity to distort
the truth. On the other hand, one might speculate that if citizens through the use of technology
are better able to acquaint themselves with modem constitutional law, they might pull the
curtain away to reveal an intellectually embarrassing jurisprudence. A possible synthesis of
these two concerns is that politically active citizens will use the new technology to enhance
their knowledge of government activity and ability to organize opposition to disfavored policy,
while those who remain ignorant of the political system will become increasingly disenchanted
with governmental institutions.
99. There are, of course, the rare situations in which a court for primarily prudential reasons
employs the political question doctrine, declares the issue nonjusticiable, and leaves the
resolution of the matter to the other branches. See, e.g., Orlando v. Laird, 443 F.2d 1039, 1043-
44 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 869 (1971) ("The form which congressional authorization
should take is one of policy, committed to the discretion of the Congress and outside the power
and competency of the judiciary, because there are no intelligible and objectively manageable
standards by which to judge such actions.").
100. See Morin, supra note 86, at A6.
101. See id.
102. See Peter Jackson, Judges, State Lawmakers at Odds, HARRISBURG PATRIOT &
EVENnG NEWS (Pa.), Oct 5, 1997, at B13. Presumably the "forgotten branch" is the judiciary;
one wonders how many Americans would agree if the current Congress proposed to scrap the
Supreme Court as wasteful governmental spending on left-wing causes.
103. See id. Jackson, being a reporter, is presumably better educated on the First Amendment
than the typical citizen. Nevertheless, he makes a fundamental error in stating that "one-quarter
cannot name any of the rights granted by the First Amendment." Id. (emphasis added). Central
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Thus, despite the increased access to information and their representatives,
whether average voters in fact use the access to further their civic duties as
citizens in a republic is an altogether different matter.' The wide variety of
options now available to individuals facilitates a retreat into insular enclaves to
entertain only those (often frivolous) topics citizens wish to address and to hear
only those voices with which they agree." 5 Such activity was not unusual prior
to the late twentieth century advances in communication technology, but from the
multitude of narrowly focused cable channels to the personally tailored electronic
newspaper of the not-so-distant future, the immersion has never been easier.
Furthermore, the elites in the press, in Congress, and in the state legislatures are
losing their position as the gatekeepers of "proper" debate and verifiable
information.0 6 In Graeme Browning's informative guide to technologically
inspired political action, Electronic Democracy, he points out the duality that
"[a]t the same time that the World Wide Web provides community activists who
can't afford to travel to Washington access to a wide range of Environmental
Protection Agency data on toxic chemicals, it also gives white supremacist groups
a soapbox from which to spout their loathsome theories."'0 7 Nevertheless, the
growing prominence of on-line journalism demonstrates that it will soon lose the
to the concept of the Bill of Rights is the notion that it merely recognized pre-existing
fundamental rights which do not flow from the government but rather inhere in the individual.
104. Social commentators have long noted how the characteristics of the television medium
affect the reporting of news which is often chosen on the basis of its entertainment value. See,
e.g., NORMAN CORWIN, TRiVLALIZING AMERICA: THE TRIUMPH OF MEDIOCRITY 33-39 (rev. &
enlarged ed. 1986).
105. Brown University President Vartan Gregorian observes that
the popular prediction that electronic communication would create a global
village is wrong. [Instead,] [w]hat is being created.., is less like a village than
an entity that reproduces the worst aspects of urban life; the ability to retreat to
small communities of the like-minded, where we are safe not only from
unnecessary interactions with those whose ideas and attitudes are not like our
own, but also from having to relate our interests and results to other communities.
Grossman, supra note 72, at 207. The Internet may result in more than a "retreat to small
communities of the like-minded," but in fact a retreat into solitude-a trend with profound
implications for both psychological health and one's ability as an individual to interact with
groups of any size. See Amy Harmon, Sad, Lonely World in Cyberspace, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30,
1998, at Al. But cf Internet Users Aren't Isolated Loners, Report Finds, COMM. DAILY, Dec.
29, 1997, available in 1997 WL 13781797 (discussing surveys which found that Internet users
are "more socially and politically active than many nonusers").
106. See ELECTIONS IN CYBERSPACE: TOWARD A NEW ERA IN AMERICAN POLITICs at v
(Anthony Corrado & Charles M. Firestone eds., 1996) (stating that the new communication
technology is "reducing the need for traditional intermediaries (such as journalists, editors, and
other gatekeepers) to filter or alter political messages and information") (parenthetical in
original); Perritt, supra note 5, at 164 ("The Internet threatens civic institutions such as the
press, old interest groups, and professions (including the bar).") (parenthetical in original).
107. GRAEME BROWNING, ELECTRONIC DEMOCRACY: UsING THE INTERNET TO INFLUENCE
AMERICAN POLITICS 71-72 (1996).
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stigma of chaos, sensationalism, and unreliable reporting and take a position
equal, if not superior, to that of traditional journalism." 8
In sum, political structures designed to rein in democratic excess are in decay,
as "[b]oth American political culture and American political institutions have
become even less republican and more democratic during the twentieth
century."' 9 It is no coincidence that an atmosphere of declining political
courage11o corresponded with the election in 1992 of a President inclined to craft
his words, if not his agenda, by polls more often than principles"' and a Congress
where constituent service is next to godliness." 2 Beyond the issue of whether the
President and Congress rely too heavily on polling is the more fundamental
question of whether polls are "telling people what to think.""..3 If the pervasive
use of polls and publishing of poll results are corroding every citizen's ability to
carefully deliberate and reach a conclusion independent of majority whim, the
prospects for sound public policy grounded in logic and truth are on the decline.
108. See Jamie Heller, Industry View, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 1998, at D6. Cyberjoumalist Matt
Drudge, a pioneer in the field of on-line journalism who has raised skeptical eyebrows in the
traditional media, observes that
We have entered an era vibrating with the din of small voices. Every citizen
can be a reporter, can take on the powers that be.... The [Internet] gives as much
voice to a [31]-year-old computer geek like me as to a CEO or speaker of the
House. We all become equal.
Matt Drudge, Anyone with a Modem Can Report on the World, Address Before the National
Press Club (June 2,. 1998) (visited Nov. 12, 1998) <http://www.frontpagemag.com
Archives/miscellaneous/drudge.htm>.
109. Mark A. Graber, The Clintonification of American Law: Abortion, Welfare, and
Liberal Constitutional Theory, 58 OHIo ST. L.J. 731, 809 (1997).
110. Historian Michael Beschloss notes that the prevalence of polls and heightened media
scrutiny make the exercise of political courage greatly more difficult today than only 30 years
ago. Michael Beschloss, Address at the Kennedy School of Government (Nov. 11, 1997).
111. The use of a strong polling strategy by presidents is a phenomenon which commenced
in the 1970s. The cost of polling reflects its increased use. Whereas in 1989 and 1990 George
Bush spent $216,000 for public opinion polls, Bill Clinton spent nearly $2 million in 1993
alone. Polling served Clinton well in terms of giving him the ability to closely tailor his
message so that it will resonate with the public. See James M. Perry, Clinton Relies Heavily on
White House Pollster to Take Words Right Out of the Public's Mouth, WALL ST. J., Mar. 23,
1994, at AI6. The contention that throughout his term of office President Clinton based his
policy positions on the polls drew a rejoinder from advisor Paul Begala, who argued that the
"[a]dministration uses polls as feedback, not to chart a course." See James Camey, Playing the
Numbers, TIME, Apr. 11, 1994, at 40, 40.
112. In a survey of senior congressional staffers, 56% cited effective constituent service to
be the key factor determining a legislator's political support, compared to 11% who believed
the legislator's legislative record to be most important. See Eric O'Keefe & Aaron Steelman,
Why Incumbents Yearn For Reforms, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 17, 1997, at B4. In addition, an
American National Election Study discovered that of the voters who requested service from
their representative and were "very satisfied" with that service, 64.7% voted for the incumbent
compared to 3% for the challenger. Id.
113. Karen Hosler, Do Polls Tell People What to Think?, BALTimORE SUN, Sept. 19, 1996,
at 2A. While the effect of polling data on public opinion has not yet been conclusively
established, "news reports based on daily waves of ever more finely-tuned polls clearly have
an impact on elections." Id.
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The sphere of ideas deemed to be "proper" would be increasingly dictated by the
subtle, coercive effect of the majority viewpoint." 4 Such an atmosphere also
threatens the proper functioning of an independent judiciary guided only by
precedent, a logical interpretation of statutes and the Constitution, and the long-
standing traditions of the American people.
In short, the United States long ago began moving away from its republican
roots towards a system more closely resembling a pure democracy."' More than
ever before, the technology is now in place for citizens to exert direct or indirect
control over the decisions of their representatives. The leadership of activist
organizations, effectively locating and bringing into the fold converts from the
masses, could become the power brokers of the next century. Due to
developments unforeseen by the Founders, the burden of keeping the
constitutional ship on a proper course is today largely the province and duty of
the "last republican bastion in our democratic society": the Judiciary." 7
Notwithstanding the egalitarianism that permeates our legal and social
institutions, the entrustment of such a delicate task to elites imbued with atypical
intelligence and temperament is nothing new. As William Henry notes in his
"heretical" book In Defense of Elitism, "[i]n the unspoken assumptions that
underlie everyday discourse, we are an elitist society because nothing else is
logical. In the exchange of lies and euphemisms that constitutes the surface of
114. The coercion of the majority viewpoint is poignantly illustrated by a dialogue in The
Fountainhead:
"You know," [the Dean] said, 'you would sound much more convincing if you
spoke as if you cared whether I agreed with you or not."
"That's true," said Roark. "I don't care whether you agree with me or not."...
"You don't care what others think-which might be understandable. But you
don't care even to make them think as you do?"
"No." . . .
... You are a man not to be encouraged. You are dangerous."
"To whom?" asked Roark.
But the Dean rose, indicating that the interview was over.
AYN RAND, TiH FOUNTAI*HAD 26 (Signet Books 1971) (1943).
115. For example, the ratification of the 17th Amendment in 1913 implemented the
mechanism for the direct election of senators. See C.H. HOEBEKE, TIE ROAD TO MASS
DEMOCRACY: ORIGiNAL ITrENT AND THE SEvENTEENm AMENDMENT 27 (1995) ("The driving
force behind the Seventeenth Amendment was the firtherance of democracy, which is exactly
what the founders were trying to prevent when they deliberately placed the Senate beyond the
immediate popular reach.").
116. Several factors contribute here. For example, compared to the expense of mass mailings
(materials, purchasing lists, etc.), the expense of sending e-mail messages is negligible.
Furthermore, substantially more effort is required on the part of the would-be financial or
petition supporter to contact the activist organization-writing a letter and mailing a request
for information or picking up a phone and calling long distance compared with the convenience
of typing two lines and e-mailing them when prompted to do so on an organization's web site,
a location that one might have stumbled upon by happenstance or a link from yet another
politically aligned activist organization.
117. Graber, supra note 109, at 810.
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polite discourse, we are egalitarian, because nothing else is diplomatic.""..8 In
accordance with this principle, the Founders delegated the task of constitutional
interpretation to the elites of the judicial branch and insulated that branch from
undue influence by the masses. The problem now confronting the judiciary is that
an electorate often unwilling to defer to the wisdom of its representatives is, in
theory at least, less likely to defer to the wisdom of unelected judges.
However, given the current insulation of the judiciary from the public, one
might wonder why a Supreme Court Justice, much less a lower federal court
judge, should be concerned about the impulses of an electorate which hardly
seems to be aware of the judiciary's existence. The answer is that, unlike the
television revolution, the computer revolution will effect the judiciary.
The Web is but the latest development in a long chain of technological
advances which have threatened the political establishment. William Jennings
Bryan's use of the railroads to take his message directly to the people, President
Franklin D. Roosevelt's fireside chats, the televising of the 1960 Kennedy-Nixon
debates, and the 1992 Ross Perot presidential campaign are all instances in which
"technology and politics have intersected with such force that the political
landscape was unalterably changed."".9 Unlike television, however, the Internet
will impact the judiciary because judges communicate almost exclusively through
the use of text, which is not readily convertible to a fast-paced visual medium.
The Internet is a text and (usually) still-picture based medium. 2 ' On television,
the nuances of a court decision are lost in the translation; often the
pronouncements cannot be fully appreciated or understood without the context
of those words and the building blocks of precedent used to argue for the holding.
The masses, to the extent they are even aware that a decision was issued,
usually only learn of the holding and have no idea how the majority reached the
decision it did.' The lack of in-depth knowledge stems from a variety of
118. WILLIAM A. HENRY III, IN DEFENSE OF ELITIsM 31 (1994).
119. BARTA, supra note 93, at 386-87. Barta contends that the Perot candidacy represents
the fourth technology driven major political change in the past 100 years: "The sea change of
1992 was the emergence of 'electronic campaigning' largely exploited by Ross Perot-talk
shows, cable TV, electronic town halls, infomercials, campaign videos, satellite television,
faxed information, computer bulletin boards-all aimed at more participatory democracy." Id.
at 387.
120. Technological trends suggest that the computer and television will eventually merge
into a single device, what some call the "teleputer." GEORGE GILDER, LIFE AFTER TELEVISION:
THE COMING TRANSFORMATION OF MEDIA AND AMERICAN LIFE 45 (rev. ed. Norton 1990).
Gilder optimistically argues that the teleputer will shun television's vices and improve upon
all of its benefits:
Rather than exalting mass culture, the teleputer will enhance individualism.
Rather than cultivating passivity, the teleputer will promote creativity....
Perhaps most important, the teleputer will enrich and strengthen democracy
and capitalism around the world....
Television is a tool of tyrants. Its overthrow will be a major force for freedom
and individuality, culture and morality. That overthrow is at hand.
Id. at 46-49.
121. Sometimes no decision at all, such as an order denying review of a lower court decision,
is erroneously interpreted by the press to be a decisive statement of the law. See Ruth Bader
Ginsburg, Address, Informing the Public About the U.S. Supreme Court's Work, 29 LoY. U.
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practical considerations. The widespread lack of interest by viewers and readers
determines the amount of information that those who are interested in judicial
opinions are able to read and hear. In addition, the traditional print and (in
particular) video and radio media cannot feasibly print or read long excerpts from
court opinions due to the inherent limitations of each medium. In contrast,
individuals at their leisure can read court opinions on the Internet, and interest
groups-as well as ordinary citizens-will increasingly offer their line by line
interpretation and criticism of controversial cases.' Prior to the advent of the
new technology, such an exchange would have been too time consuming,
frustrating, and impracticable, but in the near future, if not already, it will be
second nature.
It is within this environment that judges will increasingly be called upon to
scrutinize ballot initiatives-laws directly enacted by the majority which have not
been filtered through the legislative process where minority interests can halt or
at least modify a law prior to enactment.123 Judges are more vulnerable to attacks
that this supposedly more democratic procedure has been short-circuited by
judges bent on thwarting majority will, 24 a charge sometimes even leveled by
other judges. 25 In addition to the novel problems of statutory interpretation
presented by a statewide ballot initiative,' 6 there is the problem that judges will
Ci. L.J. 275, 279 (1998).
122. See, e.g., Rebuttal to Dissent in Romer v. Evans (visited Nov. 5, 1998)
<http://www.rdrop.com/-halfCreationsfWritings/Romer-v-Evans/ScaliaRebuttal.htmrl>.
123. For an in-depth analysis of'judicial interaction with laws passed by popular vote, see
Patrick L. Baude, A Comment on the Evolution of Direct Democracy in Western State
Constitutions, 28 N.M. L. REV. 343 (1998); Kimberle Crenshaw & Gary Peller, The
Contradictions of Mainstream Constitutional Theory, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1683 (1998); Marci
A. Hamilton, The People: The Least Accountable Branch, 4 U. Cm. L. ScH. RoUNDTABLE I
(1997); Hans A. Linde, Practicing Theory: The Forgotten Law of Initiative Lawmaking, 45
UCLAL. REv. 1735 (1998); Matthew L. Spitzer, Evaluating Direct Democracy: A Response,
4 U..CHi. L. SCa. ROUNDTABLE 37 (1997); and Michael Vitiello & Andrew J. Glendon, Article
II Judges and the Initiative Process: Are Article III Judges Hopelessly Elitist?, 31 Loy. L.A.
L. REv. 1275 (1998).
124. Occasionally, political actors will submit that the activity of striking down laws passed
by "self-governing people" is alone sufficient evidence of "judicial activism." Former Attorney
General Edwin Meese in June 1997 congressional hearings maintained, "[i]t is hard not to
regard the Romer decision as the pinnacle ofjudicial arrogance: Six appointed justices struck
down a law passed by 54 percent of a state's voters in a direct election, the most democratic
of all procedures." Judicial Activism: Defining the Problem and Its Impact. Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Federalism, and Property Rights of the Comm. on the
Judiciary, 105th Cong. 17, 23-24 (1997) (statement of Edwin Meese m, Heritage Foundation).
125. The Ninth Circuit's decision in CoalitionforEconomicEquity v. Wilson, with its strong
criticism of the district court judge, is itself notable for its commentary on the
countermajoritarian difficulty. Judge Diarmuid O'Scannlain, writing for the three-judge court,
asserted that "[a] system which permits one judge to block with the stroke of a pen what
4,736,180 state residents voted to enact as law tests the integrity of our constitutional
democracy." Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 122 F.3d 692, 699 (9th Cir.), cert denied,
118 S. Ct. 397 (1997).
126. See generally Jane S. Schacter, The Pursuit of "Popular Intent": Interpretive Dilemmas
in Direct Democracy, 105 YALE L.J. 107 (1995) (exploring the methodology used by courts
when interpreting laws enacted through the initiative process).
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be writing for a different audience. Although voters might be concerned when the
striking down of a legislatively enacted statute results in a setback to a policy
position they support, human nature suggests that citizens will more carefully
examine the basis for judicial intervention if an initiative in which they personally
invested a vote is nullified.
California's Proposition 209, the most dramatic example of statewide initiatives
of recent years, passed in November of 1996 by a margin of 54 to 46%127 and was
unsuccessfully challenged in federal court.' That same year, however, a
Colorado constitutional amendment passed via a statewide ballot that purported
to merely wipe out all statewide local sexual orientation-based anti-discrimination
ordinances met its fate in Romer v. Evans'29 when the Supreme Court struck the
measure down by a 6-3 count. 30 The Romer decision elicited anger among
conservatives, especially the "religious right," and may have provided a catalyst
for the activity by activists and members of Congress discussed in the following
part.
B. Developments in the 105th Congress: Oversight or
Activism?
Given the vital importance the "least dangerous branch" must play in steering
the constitutional ship entering twenty-first century waters, the growing number
of calls for restraint or removal of federal judges due to disagreement with the
substance of their decisions presents an ominous trend for constitutional stability.
In Congress and from activist groups, charges of "judicial activism" can be
heard.' Whether acting out of frustration with the imposition of elitist values by
unelected government officials, executing Congress's constitutional duty to check
the other branches of government, responding to pressure from activists (and
127. See Coalition for Econ. Equity, 122 F.3d at 697. The amendment to California's
constitution states that "[t]he state shall not discriminate against, or grant preferential treatment
to, any individual or group on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin in the
operation of public employment, public education, or public contracting." CAL. CONST. art. ,
§ 31(a).
128. See Coalition for Econ. Equity, 122 F.3d at 711.
129. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
130. Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, found that "[tihe amendment withdraws from
homosexuals, but no others, specific legal protection from the injuries caused by
discrimination, and it forbids reinstatement of these laws and policies," id. at 627, and that the
Colorado Legislature's motive was a "'bare. . .desire to harm a politically unpopular group
[which] cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest,' id. at 634 (quoting Department
of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973) (omission and emphasis in original) (alteration
added)). In response, Scalia charged that the majority "verbally disparag[ed] as bigotry
adherence to traditional attitudes... [which] is nothing short of insulting." Id at 652 (Scalia,
J., dissenting).
131. The term "judicial activism" has proved in practice to be sufficiently malleable for use
by all shades of the political spectrum in attacking court decisions. The phrase is usually
employed pejoratively to refer to judges who insist on imposing their political whims on the
electorate through the law. For a working definition of "judicial activism," see HARWOOD,
supra note 19, at 2-5. The terminology is also occasionally used by judges against other judges.
See discussion infra text accompanying note 258.
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financial supporters), or merely pursuing expedient political goals, many
politicians and activists are increasingly questioning the legitimacy of the judicial
countermajoritarian role.
A defining moment in the ongoing tension between Congress and the federal
judiciary arrived in September 1997 when House Majority Whip Tom DeLay
issued a warning to would-be imperialist judges: "The judges need to be
intimidated. They need to uphold the Constitution."'' He added that if the judges
refuse to yield, "we're going to go after them in a big way."'3 Thereafter, DeLay
announced that some members of Congress were preparing a list of judges in
order to implement his earlier call in March for judicial impeachments. 134
DeLay's proposed solution drew opposition not only from constitutional scholars,
but fellow Republicans as well.
135
What most critics of DeLay's comments overlooked was the key role played by
anti-"judicial activist" interest groups and the possibility that he was merely
"echoing the call of various conservative groups, particularly from within the
'Religious Right."" 36 The following account (which is intended to be more
descriptive than analytical) illustrates the impact of interest group power 37 and
the degree to which many legislators distrust the federal courts.
132. Joan Biskupic, Hill Republicans Target 'Judicial Activism,' WASH. POST, Sept. 14,
1997, at Al.
133. Id.
134. See Hands Off the Judges: Impeachment ofFederal Judges Ought to Be Used Only for
Those Accused of Criminal Behavior, VIRGINIAN-PILOT & LEDGER-STAR (Norfolk, Va.), Apr.
3, 1997, at BIO, available in 1997 WL 6399551.
135. In response to a national campaign to impeach district court judge Stewart Dalzell,
Judiciary Committee member Senator Arlen Spector stated that although he believed the judge
had committed "a very serious error in legal judgment,... no matter how egregious or wrong
the legal judgment may be, that is not grounds for impeachment." Paul Bomberger, Shows Take
Their Case to Capitol, INTELLIGENCER J. (Lancaster, PA), Sept. 18, 1997, at Al. In addition,
the current Chief Justice of the Supreme Court (who is clearly not a defender of liberal judicial
activism), believes that removing judges solely for the substance of their decisions is not a
proper use of the impeachment power:
All of the charges against [Supreme Court Justice Samuel] Chase... were based
on his performance of judicial duties while on the bench. Had Chase been
convicted, it would have been a relatively short step, though by no means an
inevitable one, for Congress to use impeachment as a method of curbing judges
whose rulings did not please the dominant viewpoint in that body. Chase's
acquittal shut the door on that possibility.
Rehnquist, supra note 19, at 910.
136. Steven W. Fitschen, Impeaching Federal Judges: A Covenantal and Constitutional
Response to Judicial Tyranny, 10 REGENT U. L. REV. 111, 113 (1998). The day before DeLay
initiated his impeachment campaign, he received a briefing from the National Legal Foundation
(of which Fitschen is president) advocating the impeachment of the Romer v. Evans Court and
a copy of DAVID BARTON, IMPEACHMENT!: RESTRAINING AN OVERACTIVE JUDICIARY (1996).
See Fitschen, supra, at 113 n.12.
137. See Perritt supra note 5, at 195 ("The Internet makes it easier to organize and maintain
interest groups, both within and across state boundaries.").
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After having issued in the 1992 Planned Parenthood v. Casey1 3' decision what
will likely be the last word from the Supreme Court concerning the continued
vitality of Roe v. Wade,'39 the Court in the 1996 Romer v. Evans decision may
have crowned Roe's heir in terms of the ability of a single case to antagonize
religious groups and mobilize interest group opposition to the Supreme Court.
Justice Scalia's angry response to the Romer decision paralleled the fierce
reaction from many academics, especially those in the conservative legal
community. 140 Steven Fitschen, whose organization, the National Legal
Foundation, called for the impeachment of the six Justices who signed the Romer
majority opinion,14 ' recalls the cooperation among interest groups as they
communicated their outrage via a variety of media following the announcement
of the decision:
By May 23, 1996 .... Free Congress [Foundation]'s President, Paul Weyrick,
citing the research of the National Legal Foundation, called for the
impeachment of the "Romer Six" during his Direct Line Commentary on
National Empowerment Television. Weyrich's commentary was in turn
picked up and reproduced by Intercessors for America and a Focus on the
Family fund appeal letter .... Thomas L. Jipping, also of Free Congress,
began a steady barrage of op-ed pieces in the Washington Times warning of
the dangers of judicial activism, including some pieces which advocated
impeachment of federal judges. Phyllis Schlafly of the Eagle Forum
suggested impeachment as one of several remedies to the problem of judicial
tyranny in both her February 1997 and March 1997 newsletters.' 42
The Washington, D.C.-based Free Congress Foundation appears to be the most
successful and respected of the organizations lobbying for a curtailment of federal
judicial power. From the utilization of interactive Internet and satellite
broadcasts'43 to educate its target audience of the sources of and solutions to
138. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
139. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
140. See, e.g., ROBERTH. BORK, SLOUCING TOWARDS GOMORRAH 114 (1996) ("There is
no logical or constitutional foundation for the majority's decision in Romer v. Evans."); John
Daniel Dailey & Paul Farley, Colorado's Amendment 2: A Result in Search of a Reason, 20
HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 215, 242-68 (1996); Fitschen, supra note 136, at 149 ("['The Romer
6' are guilty of] rendering unconstitutional opinions, subverting the fundamental laws, and
introducing arbitrary power [which] are all high crimes and misdemeanors that constitute
impeachable offenses."). See generally Louis Michael Seidman, Romer's Radicalism: The
Unexpected Revival of Warren Court Activism, 1996 Sup. CT. REv. 67; Steven A. Delchin,
Comment, Scalia 18:22: Thou Shall Not Lie with the Academic and Law School Elite; It Is an
Abomination-Romer v. Evans and America's Culture War, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 207
(1996).
141. See Charles Levendosky, Religious Right Targets Justices For Impeachment Over
Amendment 2, DENv. PosT, Oct. 16, 1996, at B7 (characterizing the call for the impeachment
of six Supreme Court Justices as a "crackpot idea").
142. Fitschen, supra note 136, at 114-15 (footnotes omitted).
143. The Free Congress Foundation's Judicial Selection Project hosted the "Taking Back
Our Constitution" series, which aired on National Empowerment Television ("NET") from
September 1997 through August 1998. The series in part discussed "the impact of judicial
activism on the legislative process, direct democracy, individual liberty and self-government"
and offered such solutions as "[i]mplementing judicial selection, impeachment and appellate
jurisdiction" and "[e]nforcing judicial term limits, reconfirmation and legislative change in
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"judicial activism,""' to comprehensive and systematic methods of grassroots
coalition-building, the Free Congress Foundation is employing twenty-first
century lobbying techniques. This activity by Free Congress and other
organizations 4 has triggered a flurry of opposition from both ideological
opponents, such as the People for the American Way ("PFAW")146 and National
Organization for Women,147 and institutional defenders of the judiciary such as
the American Judicature Society. 4
8
In January 1997, the Free Congress Foundation gathered together a coalition
of 253 conservative organizations which included such political heavy-weights
as the National Rifle Association and the Christian Coalition and jointly signed
a letter to Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott pledging to "promote judicial
restraint and fight judicial activism with whatever tools and resources are
legitimately at our disposal."'149 The following six months witnessed a substantial
amount of legislative proposals (some new and others perennial) expressing the
temperament of that letter. Because the following overview of legislation and
hearings reviews the activity of a Republican Congress, it will necessarily focus
on activities by those on the "right" side of the political spectrum. Although lower
judicial procedures." Free Congress Found., Who Killed the Constitution?! (1997)
(unpublished publicity flyer on file with author). Interested citizens could participate in the free
interactive conference by registering at the Free Congress Foundation web site. See Free
Congress Research and Education Foundation, Taking Back Our Constitution (visited Nov. 4,
1998) <http://www.freecongress.org/constitution/>.
144. See the Free Congress web site for its definitions of the terms "judicial restraint' and
"judicial activism," as well as specific examples of this activism. See What is Judicial
Activism? (visited Nov. 12, 1998) <http:llwww.freecongress.orgjsmp/Activism.htm>; Judicial
Activism Examples (visited Nov. 12, 1998) <http://www.freecongress.org/jsmp/
actvexmpls.htm>.
145. See, for example, the web site of the American Center For Law and Justice, which seeks
to educate interested citizens on the dangers of the "Imperial Judiciary" endangering religious
freedom. The American Center for Law and Justice (visited Nov. 4, 1998) <http://www
.aclj.org>. The Prolife.org website features the Ultimate Pro-Life Resource List which aspires
to be the "most comprehensive listing of right to life resources on the Internet." The Ultimate
Prolife Resource List (visited Nov. 4, 1998) <http://vww.prolife.orglultimate>. Among other
features, the web site offers full text and overview formats of key privacy cases with some
commentary, including Griswold v. Connecticut, Eisenstadt v. Baird, Webster v. Reproductive
Health Services, and Planned Parenthood v. Casey. See Roe v. Wade: 26 Years of Life Denied
(visited Dec. 16, 1998) <http://www.prolife.org/rvw/court.html>.
146. People for the American Way (visited Nov. 4, 1998) <http://www.pfaw.org>. E-mail
subscription lists are the bread and butter of interest groups, and PFAW's Right Wing Watch
Online offers a thorough (and often even objective) account of the opposition's activities. The
National Rifle Association ("NRA") and the National Organization for Women likewise make
extensive use of e-mail subscription lists designed to inspire collective action for or against
legislation at both the state and federal level. See, e.g., E-mail from NRA Alerts, Feb. 8, 1998
(containing information on state legislation affecting gun owners) (on file with author); E-Mail
from the National Organization for Women, Oct. 10, 1997 (containing legislative updates on
reproductive rights) (on file with author).
147. National Organization for Women (visited Nov. 4, 1998) <http://www.now.org>.
148. American Judicature Society (visited Nov. 4, 1998) <http://www.ajs.org>.




federal court judges increasingly find themselves targeted by the right, the
politicization of the Supreme Court confirmation process is, however, arguably
a specialty of the left. 5 '
In the summer of 1997, the Senate Constitution, Federalism and Property
Rights Subcommittee held a series of three hearings on "Judicial Activism:
Defining the Problem and Its Impact." These hearings were held because "judicial
activism strikes at the heart of our system of separation of powers and it
represents a real . . . and tangible threat to the people's freedom to govern
themselves.' ' 51 Likewise, the House in May heard testimony on "judicial
misconduct" which implicitly addressed "judicial activism."'152
During the eighteen months prior to DeLay's comments, the rate of federal
judicial confirmations had slowed dramatically,'53 due to either institutional
150. Although former Supreme Court clerk Edward Lazarus rejoiced at the Senate's rejection
of Judge Robert Bork's nomination to the Supreme Court, he mused that:
In so subordinating constitutional interpretation to the demands of a single
suspect doctrine [privacy], [Senate Democrats] invited precisely the charge they
leveled against Boik and his supporters: that they had no regard for the integrity
of the law or of the Court but only wanted their political point of view to prevail.
EDWARD LAZARUS, CLOSED CHAMBERS 247 (1998); see also BORK, supra note 38, at 268
(recalling Senator Edward Kennedy's infamous rendition of "Robert Bork's America" in a
speech on the Senate floor); STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CONFIRMATION MESS 150 (1994)
(contending Bork's views were as within the mainstream as "just about any other nominee in
recent decades[, and] we enact a terrible threat to the independence of the judiciary if we
pretend the views are extremist when we really mean simply that we disagree with them"); cf
MARK GrrENSTEN, MATrERS OF PRINCIPLE 14-17 (1992) (contending that Bork "would have
been the only Justice in history to espouse such a narrow view of the Constitution"). For
alternative views of the Justice Clarence Thomas confirmation hearings, compare DAVID
BROCK, THE REAL ANITA HILL 108 (1993) (contending that Senate staffers and anti-Thomas
activists forced an uncooperative Anita Hill into the limelight in an attempt to "Bork" Thomas),
with TIMOTHY M. PHELPS & HELEN WINTERNIaz, CAPITOL GAMES 392 (1992) (characterizing
Thomas as a man of questionable sincerity and speculating that Hill could have won a sexual
harassment suit against Thomas), and SENATOR BARBARA BOXER, STRANGERS IN THE SENATE
37-57 (1994) (discussing the momentum for political change in the aftermath of the Thomas-
Hill hearings).
151. JudicialActivism: Defining the Problem and Its Impact: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on the Constitution, Federalism, and Property Rights of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th
Cong. 1 (1997) (opening statement of Chairman John D. Ashcroft).
152. See Judicial Misconduct and Discipline: Hearing before the Subcomm. on Courts and
Intellectual Property Comm. of the House Judiciary Comm., 105th Cong. 70 (1997) (statement
of Roger Pilon of the Cato Institute) ("Because [judicial activism] is thought by many to
constitute judicial misconduct, some in Congress are searching [in this hearing] for ways to
discipline it.").
153. In 1996, only 17 federal district court appointments were confirmed (compared to 66
during George Bush's final year in office). During the first eight months of 1997, only 18
federal judges were confirmed by the Senate, leaving 100 seats vacant. Clinton did play some
part in the delay, having sent only 40 nominations to the Senate. Most notably, approximately
one-third of the Ninth Circuit chairs were vacant. See Ronald Brownstein, GOP Stall Tactics
Damage Judiciary, President Charges, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 28, 1997, at Al.
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inefficiency or closer vetting of the appointees.' In September, the tension over
delays in the confirmation of federal judges finally broke out into the open when
President Clinton in his radio address accused the Republicans of creating "a
vacancy crisis in our courts" in the pursuit of "the worst of partisan politics."'5 5
Taking note of DeLay's comments, Clinton further asserted, "Under the pretense
of preventing so-called judicial activism, [the Republicans have] taken aim at the
very independence our founders sought to protect. The congressional leadership
has actually threatened sitting judges with impeachment, merely because it
disagrees with their judicial opinions."' 6 Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman
Orin Hatch bluntly replied, "If you want to blame somebody for the slowness of
approving judges to the 9th Circuit, blame the Clinton and Carter appointees who
have been ignoring the law and are true examples of activist judging."'5 7
Members of Congress also introduced legislation to cut back on federal judicial
power in response to perceived overreaching by the federal judiciary. The
ambitious Judicial Reform Act of 1997 's as originally introduced by House
Judiciary Committee Chairman Henry Hyde would have required that "[a]ny
application for an interlocutory or permanent injunction restraining the
enforcement, operation, or execution of a State law adopted by referendum" must
be heard by a three-judge panel. 9 The Act also would have forbid any federal
district court "to impose, increase, levy, or assess any tax for the purpose of
enforcing any Federal or State common law, statutory, or constitutional right or
law" unless the Court satisfies an extended list of requirements," 6 and would have
154. In September, prior to the Clinton radio address, Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott
defended the process on the ground that the Senators "have a responsibility on behalf of the
American people to look very closely at judicial nominees, make sure what their record is,
because judicial activism is something we have a real problem with." President Blames GOP
for Judicial Vacancies, BALTIMORE SUN, Sept. 28, 1997, at 9A.
155. Id
156. Id. Despite President Clinton's defense of an independent judiciary, exactly four
months later first lady Hillary Rodham Clinton, in an interview on the Today show, associated
the circuit judge panel which appointed Special Counsel Kenneth Starr with a "vast right wing
conspiracy." Today: Interview with Hillary Rodham Clinton (NBC television broadcast, Jan.
27, 1998). President Clinton for his part joined Bob Dole in condemning a Fourth Amendment
ruling by Judge Harold Baer and suggested the judge should resign. See Judge Who Reversed
His Decision in Drug Case Withdraws, BOSTON GLOBE, May 18, 1996, at 5; R. Eugene
Pincham, A New Tyranny Against Judiciary, CHI. TRIB., May 23, 1996, at 30 (describing a
retired Illinois Appellate Court judge's perspective that the criticism of and threats to impeach
Judge Baer and Baer's subsequent reversal of his decision under pressure was "despicable").
157. Biskupic, supra note 132, at Al. Although the delay in confirmations has attracted
much criticism for its propensity to stifle the proper functioning of the courts, other factors may
be contributing as well. For an extended examination of the view that the post-1960
"unprecedented expansion in federal judicial business" is the primary culprit for overburdened
federal courts, see POSNER, supra note 33, at 53.
158. H.R. 1252, 105th Cong. (1997).
159. Id. §2.
160. Id. § 5.
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mandated that a party in a civil case to be tried in a federal court was "entitled to
one reassignment without cause as a matter of right."
1 61
Of these three Judicial Reform Act provisions, only the three-judge panel
requirement remained at the time of the bill's passage in the House one year later
on a voice vote. 62 Nevertheless, the panel requirement alone is significant in at
least two respects. First, in accordance with the trend towards direct democracy
and away from republican government, it represents both a congressional policy
favoring the use of directly democratic means and a distrust that federal judges
will properly exercise discretion when considering the constitutionality of
referenda.163 Second, although the requirement is limited to referenda, it must
avoid the difficulties engendered by an analogous predecessor," 4 which, prior to
its repeal in 1976, had attracted the widespread view that it was "the single worst
feature in the Federal judicial system."'65
In March and April of 1997, constitutional amendments were proposed in the
House and Senate which would amend Article III and limit the terms of federal
judges. The Senate version limits terms to ten years and provides that thereafter
the judges are eligible for reappointment and reconfirmation by the Senate.'6 The
House proposal limits each term to a maximum of twelve years, appears to permit
the judges to ascend the bench immediately after appointment, and allows twelve
months for the Senate to confirm or reject the nominee. 67 Notably, while the
House proposal does not require reappointment by a President, the Senate version
161. Id. § 6. This portion of the bill was originally introduced by Representative Charles
Canady as the Peremptory Challenge Act of 1997, H.R. 520, 105th Cong. (1997).
162. See 144 CoNG. REC. H2286 (daily ed. Apr. 23, 1998).
163. The legislation is a direct response to the actions taken by a district court judge who
granted injunctive relief against Propositions 187 and 209. See H.R. REP. No. 105-478, at 18
(1998) ("At a time when many states are using referenda as a means to provide for the
expression of collective legislative will.., it is fundamentally unfair and does not accord due
process to allow one judge to thwart that collective will.").
164. See 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (repealed 1976).
165. S. REP. No. 94-204, at 2 (1975), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1988, 1989.
166. The Senate version, introduced by Senator Smith, decrees:
The Chief Justice and the judges of both the Supreme Court and the inferior
courts shall hold their offices for the term often years. They shall be eligible for
nomination and, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, for
appointment by the President to additional terms. This article shall not apply to
any Chief Justice or judge who was appointed before it becomes operative.
S.J. Res. 26, 105th Cong. (1997).
167. The House version reads:
Notwithstanding [S]ection I of [A]rticle III of this Constitution, ajudge of an
inferior court created under that article shall not continue in office, except with
the consent of the Senate, given within the first 365 days at the beginning of each
successive 12-year period after the judge first takes office. For the purposes of
this article of amendment, ajudge who first took office before the adoption of this
article shall be deemed to have first taken office on the date of such adoption.
H.R.J. Res. 63, 105th Cong. 2 (1997).
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does require reappointment by a President other than the one who first appointed
the judge. 68
Although judicial term limits could dramatically reduce the level of
independence enjoyed by the current judiciary, the concept is once again as old
as Thomas Jefferson. The author of the Declaration of Independence was
considerably less generous than the creators of the House or Senate proposal:
[For the] difficult task in curbing the Judiciary in their enterprises on the.
Constitution ... the best [remedy] I can devise would be to give future
commissions to judges for six years... with a re-appointmentability by the
president with the approbation of both houses. If this would not be
independence enough, I know not what would be.'
69
However, Jefferson's view directly conflicts with Alexander Hamilton's position
on the issue:
That inflexible and uniform adherence to the rights of the Constitution and
of individuals, which we perceive to be indispensable in the courts of justice,
can certainly not be expected from judges who hold their offices by a
temporary commission. Periodical appointments, however regulated or by
whomsoever made, would, in some way or other, be fatal to their necessary
independence." 0
Like countless constitutional amendment proposals, the term limits amendment
never saw the House floor and died a quiet death. Nevertheless, the concept of
limiting judicial service to a set number of years could gain momentum given the
popularity, albeit continued nonpassage, of term limits for Congress. Even if the
amendment attempt is successful, it is doubtful that the power of the judiciary
would be severely undermined. A far less dramatic measure than impeachment,
term limits would still allow a judge free rein without fear of impending removal
at every step. Moreover, the Senate would likely heed institutional protocol that
demands inter-branch respect, resulting in a tradition whereby judges are re-
confirmed as a matter of course unless they hand down truly outrageous rulings.
Despite the rumblings of discontent, these legislative proposals deliver a large
quantity of smoke but produce very little fire. The various proposals have drawn
few co-sponsors, and other events-particularly Tom DeLay's comments and the
slow pace of confirmations--drew sharply negative media commentary.'
168. In addition, the Senate version contains a "grandfather clause" exempting current
judges from the amendment See S.J. Res. 26. The House version merely "resets the clock" and
treats current judges as if they were confirmed the day the amendment is ratified. See H.R.J.
Res. 63.
169. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Pleasants (1821), in THOMAS JEFFERSON ON
DEMOCRACY, supra note 32, at 65 (first omission and alterations in the original).
170. TiH FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 21, at 232.
171. See, e.g., Democracy, Judges andJacobins, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Oct. 2, 1997,
at 6B; End Congress' War on Courts, NEWSDAY, Oct. 5, 1997, at B3, available in 1997 WL
2711915; Molly Ivins, Conservatives Aim to Cripple Nation's Courts, SALT LAKE TRIB., Aug.
14, 1997, at A15, available in 1997 WL 3420130; Charles Levendosky, Endangering
America's Justice System, SAN DIEGO UNION-'IUB., Oct. 3, 1997, at B9, available in 1997 WL
14527409; Marianne Means, Taking Up a Sledge Hammer to Kill a Fly, TIMES UNION (Albany,
N.Y.), Oct 5, 1997, at B5, available in 1997 WL 3506948; Obstructionists at Work, ViRGINIA-
PILOT & LEDGER STAR (Norfolk, Va.), Sept. 22, 1997, at B8, available in 1997 WL 12456313.
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Clearly, however, political pressure from interest groups is a major reason for the
growing number of congressional proposals, and the strength of that pressure can
be traced to recently invented technology. The era of the electronic republic is
marked by increasingly sophisticated leaders of activist organizations with an
unprecedented ability to communicate with their membership. Because those
organizations are directing their attention at the courts with support, rather than
opposition, from many legislators, the judiciary can no longer afford to remain
quiescent.
III. PLANNED PARENTHOOD V. CASEY: UNSTEADY
NAVIGATION INTO TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY WATERS
Back at the courthouse, the Justices continue the struggle over how to fit the
triangular, circular, and rectangular pegs derived from a diverse modem America
into a square Constitution ratified in 1787 by a predominantly homogeneous
people. 72 Although seemingly considering the popular views of citizens on
particular issues to be irrelevant--"fundamental constitutional rights may not be
submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections"' -the Supreme
Court does monitor the pulse of the nation and often "follows the election
returns." 74 Recently, the Court has in several highly contentious cases grappled
with the implications of the countermajoritarian difficulty to a degree that rivals
Chief Justice Marshall's detailed examination of judicial authority in the
foundation case, Marbury v. Madison.
71
In a situation akin to that leading up to the 1989 abortion case, Webster v.
Reproductive Health Services, 76 in 1992 the Court was flooded with amicus
curiae briefs attempting to influence the Court's decision in Planned Parenthood
v. Casey.177 The choice confronting the four Reagan-Bush appointees in Casey
was whether to heed the strong wishes of their appointers17 ' and overrule the 1973
172. Moreover, citizens actually wielding the power of franchise at the founding were as a
group even more homogeneous: white males who owned property. Vermont (through its 1777
constitution) became one of the first states to abolish the property requirement and continued
this policy following its admission to the Union in 1791. See WHMCKERETAL., supra note 89,
at 127-28.
173. West Virginia State Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624,638 (1943).
174. SAFIRE, supra note 13, at 775. Following the war against Spain, the Democratic Party
at its convention contended that constitutional protection extended to newly acquired Puerto
Rico, a position embodied by the phrase: "We hold that the Constitution follows the flag." Ma
The Democrats lost both at the polls on election day and in court when a case concerning the
rights of Puerto Ricans supported the Republican position. This prompted author Finley Peter
Dunne's fictional creation Mr. Dooley to comment: "No matter whether th' Constitution
follows th' flag or not, the Supreme Coort follows the iliction returns." Id. at 776.
175. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803); see also supra note 17.
176. 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
177. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
178. "Presidents Reagan and Bush, elected under [the promise to appoint judges who would
overturn Roe], imposed the most stringent ideological tests for judicial appointments ever seen
in America, not only for appointments to the Supreme Court but to all the subordinate federal
courts as well." RONALD DwoRKiN, LIFE'S DOMINION 8 (Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. 1993). President
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landmark abortion case Roe v. Wade.'79 For Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and
Souter, Casey presented a Hobson's Choice"8 -Roe would have to be upheld if
the Court was to retain its legitimacy. In contrast, the fourth appointee, Justice
Scalia, saw a dilemma, and in his mind not a difficult one to resolve.''
I will use Casey as an illustration of four basic criteria that currently are of
greater importance due to the trend towards more candid opinion writing
combined with the potentially greater scrutiny ofjudicial opinions resulting from
the technological majoritarianism. First, there is the "perception problem" noted
previously, 2 the most important concern and often a product of the other three
criteria. The second aspect is the literary style and accessibility of language,
which asks whether the opinions are written in a manner easily understood by a
layperson. This element played the least significant role in Casey in terms of
accessibility, because all the opinions were written in a clear style. To the extent
that some of the rhetorical flourishes purport to establish legal standards,
however, Casey might make one long for the days of strict formalism.' The third
criteria involves an examination of whether the opinion employs a coherent logic.
Weak or strained reasoning can open ajudge up to charges that he or she is using
Bill Clinton during the 1992 presidential campaign in like manner pledged to avoid appointing
a Justice to the Court who would overturn Roe. See id. at 8-9.
179. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
180. A Hobson's Choice concerns that which appears to be a free choice, but in fact offers
no real alternative. The term is named after liveryman Thomas Hobson (1544-1631) who, in
the interest that each horse be ridden equally, obliged customers to take the horse nearest the
stable door or none at all. In contrast, a dilemma occurs when neither choice is particularly
better than the other and both entail unfortunate consequences. See SAFIRE, supra note 13, at
329-30.
181. Because the most cogent "dialogue" in Casey concerning the countermajoritarian
difficulty occurs between the joint opinion and Justice Scalia, I will primarily confine my
analysis to these two opinions.
182. See supra text accompanying note 69.
183. Definitions of "formalism" vary, but one clear definition will serve for present
purposes:
Legal Formalism asserted that the correct outcome in a legal dispute is determined
by reasoning deductively from a set of core legal principles. The imagery is of the
judge discerning the objective logic of the law, then applying that logic to the
parties at hand without the influence of any personal or political predilections.
Milton C. Regan, Jr., How Does Law Matter?, I GREEN BAG 2d 265, 269 (1998). Although the
Supreme Court has over the past few decades abandoned many aspects of formalism, see
Morgan Cloud, The Fourth Amendment During the Lochner Era: Privacy, Property, and
Liberty in Constitutional Theory, 48 STAN. L. REv. 555, 559 (1996), it is "enjoying a
resurgence in the Supreme Court," Richard A. Posner, What Has Pragmatism to Offer Law?,
63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1653, 1663 (1990). Formalism is often a target of constitutional scholars.
See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Formalism and Functionalism in Federalism Analysis, 13 GA.
ST. U. L. REV. 959 (1997) (critiquing the Supreme Court's use of formalism in federalism
cases); Jacobs, supra note 69, at 367 ("The Court must abandon the pretense that formalism
can legitimate completely its decision making and accept the challenge of legitimating its
constitutional value judgments by other methods."); Posner, supra, at 1666 ("Although
professional discourse has always been predominantly formalist, most American judges have
been practicing pragmatists, in part because the materials for decision in American law have
always been so various and conflicting that formalism was an unworkable ideal.").
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fallacious reasoning to obscure the fact that personal preference trumped
objective legal conclusions. Finally, one should consider the credibility of the
evidence used to support the logical reasoning (if any evidence is offered at all).
All of these considerations are straightforward and intuitive, but the layperson
viewpoint (the view which will become more important if one accepts the
proposition that knowledge is power) as to these considerations is often not
considered for the simple reason that most nonlawyers do not read court opinions.
A professor or law student, when presented with specious logic or
mischaracterization of precedent might be critical and perhaps write a scathing
critique with suggestions for how judges might correct the error. The action
usually ends there, for there is a consensus that nearly every judge has written
such opinions, for all manner of reasons. Private attorneys will usually not even
advance to this stage; their duty is to serve clients, and it may not be prudent (and
may even be considered unprofessional) to be highly critical ofjudges who will
be in a position to determine the fate of. future clients. The nonlawyer citizen
outside of the circle of those who, until recently, have monopolized legal
information is not so constrained by obligations to others, nor so conditioned to
respect a court opinion.
Finally, note that these considerations are interrelated. For example, a judge
can obscure weak logical reasoning with plain and conclusory language, or with
convoluted tests and obscure terminology. Often the lack of evidence will
undercut logic. Cryptic opinions which give the appearance of "hiding the ball"
can lead to perception problems, for example. Because these elements are
intertwined, they will not be evaluated separately. Instead, they will form the
backdrop for evaluating Casey's privacy/substantive due process and stare decisis
analysis in Part III.A. Thereafter, Part III.B will address some overarching
considerations.
A. Articulating a "Constitution of Principle"
At issue in Casey were five provisions of the Pennsylvania Abortion Control
Act of 1982.84 Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter issued an unusual joint
opinion, 185 which was joined in part by Justices Blackmun and Stevens. Although
upholding most of the regulations, the joint opinion explicitly reaffirmed what it
184. The Act required: a general informed consent procedure; the dissemination of certain
information to the woman at least 24 hours before the abortion is performed; the informed
consent of one parent for a minor to obtain an abortion (including ajudicial bypass procedure);
a signed statement by a married woman seeking an abortion indicating that she notified her
husband, absent certain exceptions; and certain reporting requirements for abortion providers.
See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 844 (1992) (citing 18 PA. CONS. STAT. §§
3205-3207, 3209, 3214 (1990)).
185. The decision begins, "Justice O'CONNOR, Justice KENNEDY, and Justice SOUTER
delivered the opinion of the Court." Id. at 833. Because the joint opinion is joined in part by
all members of the Court, it should be considered a controlling plurality opinion as to the
reaffirmation of the "essential holding" of Roe (joined by Justices Blackmun and Stevens) and
the manner in which the undue burden test was applied upon four of the five statutory
provisions (joined by Justices Rehnquist Scalia, and Thomas). See id. at 846, 879.
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called the "essential holding" of Roe.' 6 Nevertheless, a substantial portion of Roe
did not survive. The joint opinion jettisoned the "rigid" trimester framework of
Roe,"7 stripped the woman's right of its "fundamental" status, and downgraded
the state's interest in protecting "potential life" from "compelling" to
"substantial.'. 88 In place of the trimester framework, the joint opinion installed
the "undue burden" standard. 9 Although Justices Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas
concurred with the joint opinion in upholding four of the five provisions, the
logic behind the decisions of the two voting blocs was, as Justice Blackmun
noted, "worlds apart."'
190
Professor Ronald Dworkin contends that the joint opinion in Casey located the
basis of the abortion right by using an interpretive technique envisioning a
"constitution of principle," in direct opposition to the conservative coalition's
"constitution of detail."' 9' A constitution of principle perceives the Constitution,
particularly the Bill of Rights, to be "general, comprehensive moral standards"
which require that the "American government respect the most fundamental
principles of liberty and political decency and treat all citizens with equal concern
and respect."' 92 In contrast, the constitution of detail, embodied by the Rehnquist
and Scalia Casey dissents, derives the source of constitutional rights from "a
collection of independent historical views and opinions" of the "very specific,
concrete expectations of the particular statesmen who wrote and voted for
them."'9 3 Hence, Dworkin, among other court observers,19 4 implies that the joint
opinion explicitly rejected formalism and ushered in a new era of "principled"
constitutional interpretation.
A more accurate assessment of Casey is that it is a hybrid of formalism and
nonformalism, or nonformalism in formalist clothing. Professor Leslie Jacobs's
general assessment of Supreme Court opinion writing is particularly true with
respect to Casey:
Although I suspect (and hope) that the Justices have abandoned the idea of
formal legitimacy as the model of constitutional interpretation, they most
certainly have not done so in the explanation of their decisions. Their
decisions consistently portray the constitutional meanings as flowing
186. Id. at 846. In the joint opinion's view, the core ruling of Roe mandated: (1) a
recognition that prior to fetal viability a woman may exercise her right to choose abortion
without undue interference from the State; (2) acknowledgment of the State's power to restrict
abortions after viability provided that the law contains exceptions for pregnancies endangering
a woman's life or health; and (3) the principle that the State has legitimate interests from the
outset of the pregnancy in protecting the health of the woman and the life of the fetus. See id.
187. See id. at 873.
188. Id. at 876.
189. Id. at 879.
190. Id at 943 (Blackmun, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
191. DWORKIN, supra note 178, at 126.
192. Id at 119.
193. Id
194. See James M. Winner, Comment, Beds With Sheets But No Covers: The Right To
Privacy and the Military's Regulation ofAdultery, 31 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1073, 1087 (1998)
("[In Casey], the Supreme Court rejected Justice Scalia's strict substantive due process
formalism in Michael H.").
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inevitably from the traditional sources of meaning, and deride alternate
interpretations offered within the same decision as misguided or incorrect. 95
With this background, I will now turn to the Casey decision itself.
At the outset of the opinion, O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter began their task
with the declaration: "Liberty finds no refuge in a jurisprudence of doubt."' 96 In
announcing its decision, the joint opinion advanced three separate grounds for its
reaffirmation of Roe: the constitutional merits of Roe itself; a concern for
maintaining the Court's "institutional integrity"; and the rule of stare decisis.'97
As to the first ground, the three Justices proceeded to reiterate the Court's
privacy doctrine. Frequent criticisms of Roe include that the source of the right
to choose is not grounded in the text of the Constitution,' nor is it a fundamental
and firmly rooted right within the tradition of the American people, 9 9 nor does
Roe rest upon closely related analogous precedent.20 ' As with any controversial
constitutional issue, the Court fares better if it is able to give the electorate
"tangible" reasons for its decision; the absence of such reasons increases the
195. Jacobs, supra note 69, at 366-67 (parenthetical in original).
196. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 844 (1992).
197. Id. at 845-46.
198. The joint opinion sought to anchor the abortion right to the text of the Constitution via
the Ninth Amendment ("The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be
construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people." U.S. CONST. amend. IX.), noting
that "[n]either the Bill of Rights nor the specific practices of States at the time of the adoption
of the Fourteenth Amendment marks the outer limits of the substantive sphere of liberty which
the Fourteenth Amendment protects." Casey, 505 U.S. at 848. On the other hand, Justice
Scalia, dismissing the constitution of principle approach as driven by "nothing but
philosophical predilection and moral intuition," replied that the joint opinion erroneously
applied the Ninth Amendment to be, "despite our contrary understanding for almost 200 years,
a literally boundless source of additional, unnamed, unhinted-at 'rights,' definable and
enforceable by us, through 'reasoned judgment."' Id at 1000 (Scalia. J., dissenting inpart and
concurring in part) (quoting id. at 849).
199. See, e.g., Casey, 505 U.S. at 952-53 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) ("[i]t can scarcely be
said that any deeply rooted tradition of relatively unrestricted abortion in our history supported
the classification of the right to abortion as 'fundamental' under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.").
200. The closest analogous precedents recited by the joint opinion are the familiar references
to Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (extending substantive due process
protection to the sale and distribution of contraceptives), Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438
(1972) (striking down on equal protection grounds a state law forbidding unmarried couples
the use of contraceptives), and Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding
unconstitutional a state law forbidding a married couple to use contraceptives).
The Caseyjoint opinion argued that these three cases "support the reasoning in Roe relating
to the woman's liberty because they involve personal decisions concerning not only the
meaning of procreation but also human responsibility and respect for it." Casey, 505 U.S. at
852-53. The joint opinion's own words suffice to cast doubt upon this contention: "Abortion
is a unique act. It is an act fraught with consequences for others ..... Id. at 852 (emphasis
added). "[Trhe liberty of the woman is at stake in a sense unique to the human condition and
so unique to the law." Id, (emphasis added). "Where... the Court decides a case... to resolve
the sort of intenrely divisive controversy reflected in Roe[,]... its decision has a dimension
that the resolution of the normal case does not carry." Id. at 866-67 (emphasis added).
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likelihood that the Court will be accused of imposing its personal value system
on the electorate.2' 0
In fashioning its constitution of principle, the joint opinion stands on the
strongest ground when it invokes notions of bodily integrity (a concept rooted in
the common law)2 2 and the weakest when it uses lofty phrases that cannot
plausibly be restricted to the issue before the Court.0 3 Having abandoned a strict
formalist framework, the opinion's use of vague, general observations, rather than
specific evidence, is problematic. One such development occurs early in the
opinion; the arguably condescending tone could potentially alienate those
individuals the Court might wish to persuade.
The mother who carries a child to full term is subject to anxieties, to physical
constraints, to pain that only she must bear. That these sacrifices have from
the beginning of the human race been endured by woman with a pride that
ennobles her in the eyes of others and gives to the infant a bond of love
cannot alone be grounds for the State to insist she make the sacrifice. Her
suffering is too intimate and personal for the State to insist, without more,
upon its own vision of the woman's role, however dominant that vision has
been in the course of our history and our culture. The destiny of the woman
must be shaped to a large extent on her own conception of her spiritual
imperatives and her place in society.2
This passage could be interpreted as contending that most individuals and
groups working to limit the availability of abortion are primarily driven by a
desire that women be relegated to the domestic sphere. The text implies that this
domestication goal is the only state interest, when it is doubtful that any of the
legislators voted for the legislation for that reason.0 ' A different interpretation
centers on the balance struck by the legislature in which the state interest in
protecting a fetus is more highly regarded than a woman's interest in autonomy.
Under this view, the joint opinion is simply stating that because this balance is a
201. The joint opinion recognizes this concern: "Some of us as individuals find abortion
offensive to our most basic principles of morality, but that cannot control our decision. Our
obligation is to define the liberty of all, not to mandate our own moral code." Casey, 505 U.S.
at 850.
202. See id. at 849.
203. For example, "At the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own concept of
existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life. Beliefs about these
matters could not define the attributes of personhood were they formed under compulsion of
the State." Id. at 851.
204. Id. at 852 (each emphasis added).
205. The paramount reason for regulating abortion articulated by self-described "pro-life"
legislators is that a human life is being taken or that human life is conceptually sacred. See, e.g.,
137 CONG. REc. 34044 (1991) (statement of Rep. Robert Doman) ("'Life is the highest human
good not on its own naturalistic merits, but because life is supernatural, a gift from God.
Therefore, life is the highest human good because life is sacred."') (quoting Jessie Jackson,
Address at Pro-Life Gathering (Jan. 1977)); Health Care Reform: Women's Health: Hearings
Before the House Subcomm. on Health and Env't Energy and Commerce Comm., 103d Cong.
(1994), available in 1994 WL 14167521 (testimony of C. Ben Mitchell, Director of Biomedical
and Life Issues, Southern Baptist Convention Christian Life Commission) ("If developing
human life has no value, then perhaps legislators will decide that human life after 70 years of
age has no value. What we do to our babies we will do to anyone.").
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result of undervaluing a woman's interest due to the impetus of history and
culture, the state interest in favoring motherhood does not outweigh the pain and
suffering required of a woman to attain that interest.20 6
Either interpretation of this passage, that it stigmatizes Pennsylvania legislators
by labeling them misogynists or merely makes dry, scholarly observations of
innocent miscalculations of the woman's interest which the Court is duty bound
to correct, is plausible. The ambiguity results from the abstract constructions
"woman" and "mother," and a misleadingly simple statement of the state's
position. This ambiguity is further'compounded by the absence of any statistics,
empirical evidence, or concrete examples supporting the joint opinion's legal
position. When the Supreme Court writes controversial opinions that do not rely
upon the institutional weight of formalism, extended assertions devoid of factual
findings or persuasive case law will be insufficient.217 Otherwise, reasonable
citizens are more likely to conclude that the Justices are not engaged in scholarly
work but rather political judgments, a perception that could in the long run
severely undermine the Court's legitimacy.
In addition to the argument that the merits of Roe v. Wade justified a continued
adherence to that decision, two additional rationales, precedent and legitimacy,
were essential to the outcome of the Casey decision. The joint opinion stated that
"the reservations any of us may have in reaffirming the central holding of Roe are
outweighed by the explication of individual liberty we have given combined with
the force of stare decisis.
20 8
The amount of weight a Justice should give to precedent is an important
consideration due to the ramifications of that decision for the countermajoritarian
difficulty. The consideration often presents a "Catch-22" perception problem. On
one hand, the Court overplays its countermajoritarian hand if it
206. Justice Kennedy (or his law clerk) drafted this section of the joint opinion. See
LAZARUS, supra note 150, at 474-75; NPR: Morning Edition (radio broadcast, June 30, 1992)
(reporting that Kennedy read the "mystery of human life" portion of the opinion in court),
available in LEXIS, News Library, NPR file. Because Kennedy is a "devout practicing
Catholic with a deep personal aversion to abortion," LAZARUS, supra note 150, at 470, and
would not logically go out of his way to denigrate his personal views, the latter theory in the
text above appears more plausible. Indeed, Justice Kennedy appears to be backhanding the
infamous concurrence in Bradwell v. Illinois, which held that Illinois could deny a license to
practice law on the basis of gender. Compare Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 141
(1873) (Bradley, J., concurring in the judgment) ("The paramount destiny and mission of
woman are to fulfil the noble and benign offices of wife and mother. This is the law of the
Creator."), with Casey, 505 U.S. at 852 ("The destiny of the woman must be shaped to a large
extent on her own conception of her spiritual imperatives and her place in society.").
207. I do not contend, however, that judges need to be so meticulous when writing dicta,
when it is apparent that such assertions will not carry the force of the law. Dicta is not only a
vehicle for contributing to the marketplace of ideas, but it also allows the judge to vent his or
her frustrations stemming from the rigid nature of the law and the limitations on a judge's
ability to correct its flaws. See, e.g., DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Social Servs.,
489 U.S. 189, 213 (1989) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("It is a sad commentary upon American
life, and constitutional principles-so full of late of patriotic fervor and proud proclamations
about 'liberty and justice for all'-that this child, Joshua DeShaney, now is assigned to live out
the remainder of his life profoundly retarded.").
208. Casey, 505 U.S. at 853 (emphasis in original).
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uncompromisingly adheres to past precedents even when the premises upon which
those previous decisions were built appear to be in serious error in the light of the
modem day. On the other hand, if the Court overrules its precedents too easily,
with the only intervening factor being a shift in the Court's personnel, the people
could surmise that the interpretation process is more political than it is
scholarly.20 9
The joint opinion, in the section authored by Justice Souter,210 offered three
primary arguments for upholding Roe v. Wade based upon principles of stare
decisis: 1) the rule of Roe had "in no sense proven 'unworkable,' 211 2) certain
reliance interests had accrued since the 1973 decision, and 3) the lessons of
history counseled against the option of overruling Roe. Because the first two
reasons do not directly implicate the countermajoritarian nature of precedent, I
will only address the third and most prominent precedential argument.
Justice Souter submitted that the historical record reveals that in certain cases
overruling precedent can seriously undermine a court's legitimacy.2 12 The
framework of Justice Souter's stare decisis argument presents an opportunity to
consider both the coherent logic and the use of evidence criteria. Contorted,
result-based reasoning has served Justices of all ideological persuasions from
time to time, but will not perform its service very well in the electronic age. The
following discussion is not itself a critique of Souter's brand of stare decisis
209. "There is... a point beyond which frequent overruling would overtax the country's
belief in the Court's good faith.... The legitimacy of the Court would fade with the frequency
of its vacillation." Id. at 866. An intriguing question is why the Court declined to address the
notable head-snapping reversal of Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940)
(upholding a requirement that pupils salute the national flag in daily school exercises as a
condition of attending free public school), only three years after the case was decided. See West
Virgin- State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). Justice Frankfurter's dissent in
Barnette is particularly apt:
The Court has no reason for existence if it merely reflects the pressures of the day.
Our system is built on the faith that men set apart for this special function, freed
from the influences of immediacy and from the deflections of worldly ambition,
will become able to take a view of longer range than the period of responsibility
entrusted to Congress and legislatures.... That which three years ago had seemed
to five successive Courts to lie within permissible areas of legislation is now
outlawed by the deciding shift of opinion of two Justice[s] .... Is that which was
deemed to be of so fundamental a nature as to be written into the Constitution to
endure for all times to be the sport of shifting winds of doctrine?
Id. at 665 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
210. No one officially knows which Justices wrote what portions of the joint opinion, but
the consensus is that Souter wrote the section presenting the stare decisis arguments. See, e.g.,
LAZARUS, supra note 150, at 472 ("Souter's job was to craft [the joint opinion's] explanation
for why the principles of stare decisis argued, almost irrefutably, for reaffirming Roe.").
211. Casey, 505 U.S. at 855.
212. "In a less significant case, stare decisis analysis [would end here]. But the sustained and
widespread debate Roe has provoked calls for some comparison between that case and others
of comparable dimension that have responded to national controversies and taken on the
impress of the controversies addressed." Id at 861 (emphasis in original).
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(which has received adequate attention elsewhere21 3), but rather a hypothesis that
judges must hold themselves to a higher evidentiary standard than politicians and
the possible consequences if they do not.
The opinion focused on two landmark Supreme Court cases, Lochner v. New
York T  and Brown v. Board of Education21 s to support its argument.2 6 Lochner
was one of a long line of cases at the turn of the century which, based upon a
"liberty of contract" theory,217 imposed substantive limitations on legislation
restricting economic liberty in favor of health and welfare regulations. In one case
upholding the Lochner doctrine, the Court struck down a law requiring private
employers to satisfy minimum wage standards for women. That case, Adkins v.
Children's Hospital,"8 was overruled fourteen years later by West Coast Hotel
Co. v. Parrish,2 9 a decision which "signaled the demise of Lochner."'
Rather than conclude that the "freedom of contract" was invalid because it was
simply unsupported by the text of the Constitution or a similar principle of
constitutional interpretation, the joint opinion instead contended that by 1937
most people believed "that the interpretation of contractual freedom protected in
Adkins rested on fundamentally false factual assumptions about the capacity of
a relatively unregulated market to satisfy minimal levels of human welfare.""u1
This factual enlightenment "not only justified but required the new choice of
constitutional principle that West Coast Hotel announced. 222
According to the joint opinion, the "separate-but-equal" doctrine, which Brown
overruled, also rested primarily upon erroneous factual ground. That doctrine
began with Plessy v. Ferguson,2' which held that laws requiring racial
213. Compare David K. Koehler, Comment Justice Souter's "Keep-What-You-Want-And-
Throw-Away-The-Rest" Interpretation of Stare Decisis, 42 BUFF. L. REV. 859, 883 (1994)
("Souter resorted [in Casey] to the neutral rhetoric of stare decisis to disguise his own value
judgments and acknowledgment of social pressure."), with Liang Kan, Comment A Theory of
Justice Souter, 45 EMORY L.J. 1373 (1996) (discussing Souter's use of precedent from the time
of his tenure as a New Hampshire judge to his current position on the Supreme Court). Note
that it is not my intention to single out Souter as the only Justice prone to manipulating
precedent. See, e.g., LAzARUS, supra note 150, at 516 & n. 4 (pointing to an inconsistency
between the stare decisis methodology in Casey and Adarand); Carlson, supra note 43, at 448-
49 (contending that Justice O'Connor's majority opinion in Adarand selectively relied "on
precedent that was malleable enough to conform to the Court's most recent interpretation of
the Equal Protection Clause"); Earl M. Maltz, No Rules in a Knife Fight: Chief Justice
Rehnquist and the Doctrine of Stare Decisis, 25 RtJrGERs L.J. 669, 670 (1994) ("It would be
too simplistic to say that Chief Justice Rehnquist has no regard for precedent.").
214. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
215. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
216. Notably, the joint opinion neglected to even cite Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19
How.) 393 (1856), the infamous case widely viewed as a contributing cause of the Civil War.
Justice Scalia, however, made that case the centerpiece of his precedential argument.
217. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 56, 61.
218. 261"U.S. 525 (1923).
219. 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
220. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 861 (1992).
221. Id. at 861-62 (citing West Coast Hotel, 300 U.S. at 399).
222. Id. at 862.
-223. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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segregation in public transportation did not constitute a denial of equal protection
and rejected the argument that de jure racial separation treated the black race as
inferior. 4 The Casey plurality noted that "it was clear by 1954 that legally
sanctioned segregation [stigmatized those who were segregated with a 'badge of
inferiority,'] to the point that racially separate public educational facilities were
deemed inherently unequal.""5 Again, the factual assumptions underlying the
Plessy decision were "so clearly at odds with the facts apparent to the Court in
1954 that the decision to reexamine Plessy was on this ground alone not only
justified but required."' 6 The joint opinion thereafter reached the summit of its
argument. Whereas West Coast Hotel and Brown relied upon facts either wrong
or viewed in the wrong light, the joint opinion reasoned that
[b]ecause neither the factual underpinnings of Roe's central holding nor our
understanding of it has changed (and because no other indication of
weakened precedent has been shown), the Court could not pretend to be
reexamining the prior law with any justification beyond a present doctrinal
disposition to come out differently from the Court of 1973. To overrule prior
law for no other reason than that would run counter to the view repeated in
our cases, that a decision to overrule should rest on some special reason over
and above the belief that a prior case was wrongly decided. 7
Well, what are "the factual underpinnings of Roe's central holding?" Despite
an extended and broad discussion of the relevant facts which supposedly
commanded the Lochner and Plessy decisions, the Court offered a calculatingly
narrow set of facts supporting Roe228 and did not provide a scintilla of evidence
demonstrating that the nation's (or the Court's) understanding of the relevant
224. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 863 (citing Brown v. Board of Ed., 347 U.S. 483, 494-95).
225. Id,
226. Id
227. Id at 864 (parenthetical in original). Justice Rehnquist contended that the evidence did
not support the joint opinion's argument that the Lochner Court had acted upon perceived
factual changes: "Although the Court did acknowledge in the last paragraph of its opinion the
state of affairs during the then current Depression, the theme of the opinion is that the Court
had been mistaken as a matter of constitutional law when it embraced 'freedom of contract' 32
years previously." Id at 962 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
228. See id at 860 ("I[The attainment of viability may continue to serve as the critical fact,
just as it has done since Roe was decided; which is to say that no change in Roe's factual
underpinning has left its central holding obsolete, and none supports an argument for
overruling it."). The vast majority of Americans have concluded that blacks are as a factual
matter human beings possessing the same inherent rights as whites, in effect concluding that
Plessy v. Ferguson was wrong because it relied on an incorrect premise. In contrast, the joint
opinion conveniently concluded that Roe's viability standard was the "critical fact." Yet
"viability" is a measurement which produces facts (the fact here being the point at which a
fetus can survive outside the womb, a measurement which, like life expectancy, changes with
improvements in technology). Unless the joint opinion is contending that the "critical fact' is
that the Roe Court assumed that the point of viability would not shift (the opinion does not
provide evidence to support such a contention), viability is not itself a fact capable of being
proven or disproven.
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facts had not changed. 29 Furthermore, Lochner is frequently invoked by both
conservative and progressive Justices as the quintessential example of
impermissible judicial intervention for substantive philosophical reasons rather
than due to the Lochner Court's supposed reliance on "fundamentally false
factual assumptions. ' ' 23' The Casey joint opinion's primary basis for
distinguishing Roe from Lochner could be characterized as the use of an ex post
facto justification in support of a preordained result.2 31 In sum, the conclusions
reached by the plurality "appear to be judicial fiat and nothing contradicts the
suspicion that they stem from the personal preferences of the decision makers." 2
229. The Justices could have plausibly argued that the country's understanding of such facts
has moved in the direction of the Roe Court. Many polls suggest that the outcome of Casey is
in sync with current public opinion. See, e.g., Elizabeth Ross, Freedom of Choice Act Splits
Activists in Pro-Choice Movement, CHRISTIAN SC. MONITOR, Apr. 9, 1993, at 2.
Nevertheless, America's inability to reach a consensus as to whether a fetus is a human being
is one of the most persuasive grounds for arguing that Roe was wrongly decided, and it may
be the reason why the Caseyjoint opinion evaded a discussion of the facts underlying the Roe
opinion. Rather than leaving the fundamental question of whether a fetus is a human being to
a deliberative community-wide decisionmaking process, the Roe court instead jettisoned this
republican value and replaced it with one in which individuals determine in ad hoe fashion
crucial issues of life and death. Not surprisingly, this radical delegation of power over life and
death to individuals has lead other individuals disenfranchised by the Roe decision to leave the
community-wide decisionnaking process (which is now useless to them as a practical matter)
and function as autonomous judges who believe that fundamental moral principles compel
them to execute doctors who perform abortions, in order to delay or thwart the murder of
innocent human beings.
230. Justice Souter laid bare the unstable logic of the Casey joint opinion when, in his
dissenting opinion in Seminole Tribe v. Florida, he commented that it was
remarkable that as we near the end of this century the Court should choose to
open a new constitutional chapter in confining legislative judgments on these
matters by resort to textually unwarranted common-law rules, for it was just this
practice in the century's early decades that brought this Court to the nadir of
competence that we identify with Lochner v. New York.
Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 1176 (1996) (emphasis added). (This is indeed a
curious argument by Justice Souter, for Griswold and Roe expressly relied on little more than
"textually unwarranted" judge-created rules.) Thus, four years after Casey, Souter writes that
"textually unwarranted common-law rules" rather than Casey's "fundamentally false factual
assumptions" theory supply the predominant justification for vilifying Lochner and its progeny.
231. Although a majority of the Supreme Court continually frames the delegation of the
abortion decision to individuals as a principle grounded in notions of autonomy and self-
direction, this rhetoric is belied by its unequivocal acquiescence to state intrusion into such
decisions as whether a woman ought to smoke marijuana in the privacy of her own home or
wield a handgun for self-protection from an abusive husband. However, in an encouraging
development, two recent opinions written by Justice Clarence Thomas breach this selective
protection of liberty. See United States v. Bajakajian, 117 S. Ct. 2028, 2039 (1998)
(confiscation of entire $357,144 for failure to comply with currency reporting statute is a
penalty grossly disproportionate to the offense in violation of the Excessive Fines Clause);
Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365, 2385-86 (1997) (Thomas, J., concurring) ("Perhaps,
at some future date, this Court will have the opportunity to determine whether Justice Story was
correct when he wrote that the right to bear arms 'has justly been considered, as the palladium
of the liberties of a republic."') (quoting 3 J. STORY, COMMENTARiES § 1890, at 746 (1833)).
232. Jacobs, supra note 69, at 374.
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The conclusion that pragmatic political calculations rather than objective legal
reasoning determined the outcome of the historical stare decisis analysis is
reinforced by the unusual candor with which the joint opinion attempts to
articulate a vision of the Court's role in a democratic society and the open
disclosure of the factors being balanced by the plurality in the course of reaching
its final decision. In response to the argument that a substantial portion of the
population (more precisely, a very vocal activist segment of the population)
should be heeded, the joint opinion adopts a style not unlike a New York Times
editorial:
[T]o overrule under fire in the absence of the most compelling reason to
reexamine a watershed decision would subvert the Court's legitimacy beyond
any serious question....
The country's loss of confidence in the Judiciary would be underscored
by an equally certain and equally reasonable condemnation for another failing
in overruling unnecessarily and under pressure."3
In response, Justice Scalia chastised the plurality for what he saw as arguments
akin to rationalization by politicians rather than reasoning by judges:
A decision either way on Roe can... be perceived as favoring one group or
the other. But this perceived dilemma arises only if one assumes, as the joint
opinion does, that the Court should make its decisions with a view toward
speculative public perceptions. If one assumes instead, as the Court surely did
in both Brown and West Coast Hotel, that the Court's legitimacy is enhanced
by faithful interpretation of the Constitution irrespective of public opposition,
such self-engendered difficulties may be put to one side."'
Justice Scalia took notice of the increased public attention and pressure bearing
down on the Court, 5 and brazenly attributed its cause to the Court's improper
use of its countermajoritarian role. 6 The joint opinion's approach, in Scalia's
view, aggravated the perception problem:
As long as this Court thought (and the people thought) that we Justices were
doing essentially lawyers' work up here-reading text and discerning our
society's traditional understanding of that text-the public pretty much left
us alone. Texts and traditions are facts to study, not convictions to
demonstrate about.
23 7
The trouble, Scalia continued, began when the Justices began to impose their
personal value configurations on the nation.238 This assumption is not entirely
233. Casey, 505 U.S. at 867.
234. Id. at 963-64 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
235. See idL at 999-1000 ("How upsetting it is, that so many of our citizens... think that we
Justices should properly take into account their views, as though we were engaged not in
ascertaining an objective law but in determining some kind of social consensus.").
236. See id at 1000 ("The Court would profit, I think, from giving less attention to the fact
of this distressing phenomenon, and more attention to the cause of it. That cause permeates
today's opinion.... .") (each emphasis in original).
237. Id. (parenthetical in original).
238. See id. at 1000-01.
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valid since nearly all judging requires the use of personal values." 9 However,
Scalia adroitly identified the potential danger of the perception problem:
[I]f in reality our process of constitutional adjudication consists primarily of
making value judgments . . . then a free and intelligent people's attitude
towards us can be expected to be (ought to be) quite different.... If, indeed,
the "liberties" protected by the Constitution are, as the Court says, undefined
and unbounded, then the people should demonstrate, to protest that we do not
implement their values instead of ours.24
B. The Legacy of Casey
A Supreme Court decision with countermajoritarian characteristics should be
evaluated according to how well, in terms of efficacy, prudence, and success in
protecting individual rights, it explains the point at which the Court should
properly interject itself into the democratic political process. The four
criteria-perception, language, logic, and evidence-provide a framework for
determining whether the explanation of the Court's role was successful.
In terms of perception, one of the consequences of the shaky rationales used in
Casey is that if controversial Supreme Court decisions come to be viewed as
political rather than scholarly,24 1 the damage to the Court's power could be
tremendous. The new communication technology presents a real threat to the old
judicial order. Consider the impact of an interest group e-mailing the following
hypothetical press release to thousands of its members; it is an attack which
exploits the gap in Souter's stare decisis argument by mixing reasonable criticism
with emotionally laden historical events:
In a Supreme Court decision issued today, Justice Souter indicated that the
Court was correct in 1954 when it overruled a 100-year-old case because it
recognized that black Americans were not equal if the state could force them
to go to school separate from whites. Souter stated that it was okay to
overrule a 100-year-old case because it was based on what he calls
"fundamentally false factual assumptions." Yet in a death blow against civil
rights for the unborn, he declined to overrule a 20-year-old case legalizing
239. See POSNER, supra note 33, at 310 ("The vastness and complexity of American law.
make it inevitable that many judicial decisions will be based, in part anyway, on value
judgments rather than just on technical, professional judgments."); Jacobs, supra note 69, at
376 ("Scalia [in Casey], too, makes a political choice and, with his rhetoric, conceals it.").
240. Casey, 505 U.S. at 1000-01 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (each emphasis and the parenthetical
in original).
241. The judiciary has been a political branch from the day Marbury v. Madison was
decided; the significant and recent trend is that many scholars and practitioners believe that the
judiciary is now widely viewed by the public as a political branch. See Term Limits For
Judges?, 1996 Federalist Society Symposium, 13 J.L. & POL. 669, 694 (1997) (statement of
Charles Cooper, Cooper & Garvin) ("[T]he American people have come to accept [the
Supreme Court's] decision[s] as political and as policy-making, not as something that can be
understood as the neutral application of the rules of law as they are expressed and reflected in
the sources of law, our constitutional provisions and our statutes."); Richard A. Posner, Legal
Scholarship Today, 45 STAN. L. REv. 1647, 1653 (1993) ('The increased political diversity of
American culture has shattered the political or ideological consensus upon which a confident
sense of the law's objectivity rested.").
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abortion throughout all nine months of pregnancy. We demand that Souter
explain why he believes that a human being is not killed during an abortion.
Surely it is clear by now that Roe v. Wade was based upon the "fundamentally
false factual assumption" that an unborn child is not a human being deserving
protection from an abortionist's scalpel.242
This fictional press release illustrates some dilemmas already faced by judges
which will become more pronounced in the future. First, the press release assigns
to Justice Souter a particular political position with which he may or may not
personally agree. One does not really know if Souter "believes that a human being
is not killed during an abortion." Souter might actually believe that a human
being exists in the third trimester, and even that belief might not dictate the
outcome of a case involving a late-term abortion statute.243 The unsettling
prospect is that if the courts become a true focal point of interest group and
politician ire, institutional considerations which handicap judges may force them
to rely heavily on pro-judicial interest groups and law professors to correct the
distortions.244 The increasing frequency of the criticism of judges compels the
242. See generally CELEsTEM. CoNDrr, DECODiNGABORTION RHETORIC 49-51 (1990) for
an examination of attempts to rhetorically link abortion with slavery and the Holocaust.
Although even wholesomely reasoned opinions are subject to distortion by those who stand to
benefit, judges should be wary of inadvertently handing out ammunition to political groups on
a silver platter. A case in point is Judge Harold Baer, who in United States v. Bayless, 913 F.
Supp. 232 (S.D.N.Y.), vacated on reconsideration, 921 F. Supp. 211 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), drew
harsh criticism in particular for his contention that even though the suspects ran when they saw
law enforcement officers, the police had no probable cause to search because "residents in this
neighborhood tended to regard police officers as corrupt, abusive and violent. After the
attendant publicity surrounding the above events, had the men not run when the cops began to
stare at them, it would have been unusual." Id. at 242; see also supra note 156 (containing
additional commentary on Judge Baer's decision). Although this ground was only one of many
upon which Judge Baer rested his decision, a casual television viewer might have thought it
was the sole rationale given the quality of reporting. See, e.g., CBS Evening News: New York
Judge Throws Out Evidence Against Alleged Drug Dealers Claiming Lack of Evidence to
Search (CBS television broadcast, Jan. 26, 1996) (focusing entirely on the running-from-police
rationale).
Ironically, Judge Baer in Bayless offered a quotation that aptly described his subsequent
political predicament and the possible difficulties that judges will increasingly face in the new
Communication Age: "The great enemy of truth is very often not the lie-deliberate, contrived,
and dishonest-but the myth-persistent, pervasive and realistic." Bayless, 913 F. Supp. at 234
(quoting President John F. Kennedy, Commencement Speech, Yale University (1962)).
243. For example, many state statutes seeking to outlaw "partial birth abortion" have been
struck down on account of vagueness. In such instances, the particular actions of the parties
before the court are not at issue. Instead, the question becomes whether the statute, although
intended primarily to reach late-term abortion procedures, insufficiently defines the prohibited
activity and thus might extend to constitutionally protected activity. See, e.g., Women's Med.
Prof I Corp. v. Voinovich, 130 F.3d 187 (6th Cir. 1997); Planned Parenthood v. Woods, 982
F. Supp. 1369 (D. Ariz. 1997); Evans v. Kelley, 977 F. Supp. 1283 (E.D. Mich. 1997).
244. See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, On the Interdependence of Law Schools and Law Courts,
83 VA. L. REV. 829, 835 (1997) ("Judges need critical commentary, but we also need
defenders--caring teachers alert to the jealousy, mean spirit, oversight, or lack of
understanding that sometimes triggers unfair comment from the political branches, the press,
even the academy.").
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need for a long-term strategy addressing how the courts should, when necessary,
defend themselves from such attacks.245
Second, the new communications technology is causing a dramatic reduction
in the transaction costs incurred by interest groups seeking to monitor, inform,
and mobilize their membership.246 Likewise, whereas only a relatively few people
read court opinions in the past, this may no longer be true within the next ten
years because of the convenience and cost-effective nature of reading a court
opinion on-line, a process which does not require any knowledge of the legal
citation system. Furthermore, a press release like the one outlined above would
likely conclude with a message urging recipients to contact their legislators or the
Justices themselves; a process facilitated by including e-mail addresses and web
page links in the e-mail message which can be accessed with the click of a mouse
button. The cumulative effect of the Internet and similar forums serving as a
springboard for attacks on flawed (or supposedly flawed) judicial logic will likely
result in Americans tending to view judges as more like politicians and less like
priests.247
Given the heightened awareness of court opinions and the perception problem,
the Casey joint opinion did not falter in stating the task before the Court:
The Court must take care to speak and act in ways that allow people to accept
its decisions on the terms the Court claims for them, as grounded truly in
principle, not as compromises with social and political pressures having, as
such, no bearing on the principled choices that the Court is obliged to make.
Thus, the Court's legitimacy depends on making legally principled decisions
245. The Citizens for an Independent Judiciary, a recently established public interest
organization seeking to educate the public on the merits of an independent judiciary, is
somewhat unique in that its founders are politicians, including former New York Governor
Mario Cuomo and former Republican Representative Mickey Edwards. See Steve Lash, New
Group Steps Forward to Bolster Judiciary, CHI. DAILY L. BuLL., June 12, 1998, at 1.
246. See Perritt, supra note 5, at 169 ("Mass communication technologies such as the
Internet... reduce the transaction costs of discovering common concerns, crystallizing
positions, aggregating interests, and organizing entrepreneurship and maintenance. In other
words, the Internet facilitates political action."); Trotter Hardy, Property (and Copyright) in
Cyberspace, 1996 U. CH. LEGAL F. 217, 237 ("[C]yberspace permits bargaining over distances
and time that never before could have been possible. Cyberspace lowers the absolute amount
of transaction costs relative to the costs of the same transaction undertaken through some other
means."); Robert P. Merges, The End of Friction? Property Rights and Contract in the
"Newtonian" World of On-Line Commerce, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 115, 116 (1997) (noting
that many, though not all, business-related transaction costs are reduced by the Internet).
247. One simple but profound effect of new communications technology may be increased
public awareness of Supreme Court opinions. Lee Epstein writes:
[S]ome evidence [suggests] that the public's evaluation of the Court responds to
their awareness of the substance of Court decisions. This suggests that the
dynamics of the public's evaluations of the Supreme Court may be much like
those for Congress and the presidency. Thus, the stability of the Court's
evaluations over time may be a function of insufficient knowledge rather than an
enduring level of trust in what seems to be a Jovian institution. If this is so, then
we might well wonder if greater awareness of the Court would result in more
volatile evaluations and more problems of enforcement and compliance for an
institution whose major currency is legitimacy.
EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 35, at 373.
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under circumstances in which their principled character is sufficiently
plausible to be accepted by the Nation.248
But although the joint opinion displayed remarkable candor in some portions of
the opinion, it claims to uphold Roe even as it cuts back dramatically on the scope
of that decision.249 This aspect, when combined with the opinion's candid (and
transparently pragmatic) assessment of the political consequences of overruling
Roe,250 results in the impression that the Court handed down a political
compromise which cannot satisfy the interest groups who propelled the case into
court.25' The abortion debate continues unabated,252 notwithstanding the joint
opinion's command that the parties end the national division "by accepting a
common mandate rooted in the Constitution." '253 By demanding that interest
groups and legislators beat their swords into plowshares and accept a settlement
the plurality could not realistically expect either side to accept, 4 the strength and
integrity of the Court were undermined in Planned Parenthood v. Casey.
However, it would be erroneous to maintain that only authors of majority
opinions need concern themselves with the ramifications of communication
technology. Because of its ability to mislead the less savvy reader or provide
fodder for interest group propaganda, criticism within ajudicial opinion becomes
more important. Professor Christopher Smith argues that "[o]pinions containing
248. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 865-66 (1992).
249. See id at 944 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting in part and concurring in part) ("The joint
opinion, following its newly minted variation on stare decisis, retains the outer shell of Roe v.
Wade, but beats a wholesale retreat from the substance of that case.") (emphasis in original)
(citations omitted).
250. See text accompanying supra note 233.
251. However, the opinion may be more satisfactory for those within the judiciary who are
in a position to sympathize with the plight of O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter. In his partially
concurring opinion, Justice Blackmun lauded the joint opinion as "an act of personal courage
and constitutional principle." Casey, 505 U.S. at 923 (Blackmun, J., dissenting in part and
concurring in part).
252. The vitality of the debate surrounding the "partial birth" abortion procedure and other
abortion-related matters in Congress demonstrates that the Court's pleas have not been heeded.
See Lawrence J. Goodrich, On Capitol Hill, Abortion Battle Intensifies on Many Fronts,
CRuSTIAN Sci. MONrrOR, Sept. 9, 1998, at 4; David E. Rosenbaum, House Dares Clinton on
Abortion Bill, N.Y. TIMEs, July 16, 1998, at A26 (reporting that the House passed the Child
Custody Protection Act of 1998, H.R. 3682, 105th Cong.).
Moreover, in perhaps one of the most ironic footnotes in Supreme Court history, both of the
lead plaintiffs of the fountainhead Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton cases, Norma McCorvey and
Sandra Cano, have not heeded the Supreme Court but rather now advocate the overturning of
the cases they won in the name of abortion rights. See Ronald L Hansen & Francesca C. Simon,
"Roe" and "Doe" Disavow Roles in Abortion Rulings, Keynote Pro-life Gathering, WASH.
TIMES, Jan. 23, 1998, at C4. McCorvey declared in a Senate hearing that "the entire abortion
industry is based on a lie" and that "I am dedicated to spending the rest of my life undoing the
[case] that bears my name." Roe v. Wade Anniversary Views on Abortion: Hearings Before the
Senate Subcomm. on the Constitution, Federalism, and Private Property of the Senate
Judiciary Comm., 105th Cong. (1998) (testimony ofNorma McCorvey), available in 1998 WL
18919, at *6.
253. Casey, 505 U.S. at 867.
254. See LAZARUS, supra note 150, at 483 ("Judging by the reactions of partisans in the
courtroom, the trio's plea for peace had fallen on deaf ears.").
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open, personal attacks on fellow justices can harm the Court's image by
magnifying perceptions that personal or ideological disputes, rather than legal
principles, determine the justices' interpretations of constitutional law."" On this
point, Smith points to several opinions written by Justice Scalia. 6 The Justice's
Casey opinion provides plentiful support for this criticism, reaching a crescendo
upon the pronouncement: "The Imperial Judiciary lives. It is instructive to
compare this Nietzschean vision of us unelected, life-tenured judges... with the
somewhat more modest role envisioned for these lawyers by the Founders." '257 In
sum, although Scalia may be blessed with both a sharp wit and the company of
thick-skinned colleagues who do not likely take personal offense, it bears
consideration whether prose saturated with such blatant, condescending sarcasm
should be injected into a court opinion, particularly one likely to be read by
nonlawyers whose unfamiliarity with the law may lead them to miss the
hyperbolic qualities of Scalia's opinion. However, Scalia is not alone in this use
of rhetoric; for example, that judges have tarred other judges with the words
"judicial activism"-the "cuss words" of the opposition-is equally a cause for
concern.
2 5 8
255. CHRISTOPHER E. SMITH, JUSTICE ANTONIN SCALIA AND THE SUPREME COURT'S
CONSERVATIVE MOMENT 67 (1993).
256. See id. at 61-67. See generally Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Speaking in a Judicial Voice, 67
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1185, 1196 (1992) ("The most effective dissent, I am convinced, 'stand[s] on
its own legal footing'; it spells out differences without jeopardizing collegiality or public
respect for and confidence in the judiciary.") (quoting Collins J. Seitz, Collegiality and the
Court ofAppeals, 75 JuDICATURE 26, 27 (1991) (alteration in original)).
257. Casey, 505 U.S. at 996 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Other such
statements by Scalia are instructive: "I must, however, respond to a few of the more outrageous
arguments in today's opinion, which it is beyond human nature to leave unanswered." Id. at
981.
[A] Court that believes... that the function of this Court is to "speak before all
others for [the people's] constitutional ideals" unrestrained by meaningful text or
tradition... [and] that the Court must adhere to a decision for as long as the
decision faces "great opposition" and the Court is "under fire" acquires a
character of almost czarist arrogance.
Id. at 998-99 (quoting id. at 868) (second alteration in original). Finally, one quip
demonstrating that Scalia may have a future in standup comedy after he leaves the Court
(presumably in clubs near law schools) intones:
The Court's statement that it is "tempting" to acknowledge the authoritativeness
of tradition in order to "cur[b] the discretion of federal judges," is of course
rhetoric rather than reality; no government official is "tempted" to place restraints
upon his own freedom of action, which is why Lord Acton did not say "Power
tends to purify."
Iad at 981 (quoting id. at 847) (alteration in original).
258. The search for the following examples ofjudges using the "judicial activism" label was
greatly facilitated by computer-based legal research; the same search would have been
exceedingly difficult (if not impracticable) only 15 years ago. For use of the activism rhetoric
by Supreme Court Justices, see United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 611 (1995) (Souter, J.,
dissenting) ("[H]istory raises its objections that the Court's previous essays in overriding
congressional policy choices under the Commerce Clause were ultimately seen to suffer two
fatal weaknesses: when dealing with Acts of Congress ... nothing in the Clause compelled the
judicial activism .... ."); Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1, 13 (1990) (Stevens, J., concurring in the
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In addition to the perception problem, the Caseyjoint opinion often hid behind
vague, flowery language which obscured concrete rationales for why and how
their approach (as opposed to that of the two primary dissenters) would better
protect individual rights and secure the Court's legitimacy. Although Justice
Rehnquist's constitutional rights framework is arguably overly formalistic259 and
Scalia's approach could be characterized as flippant,26 ° their formalist
argumentation offers relatively bright lines for arguing whether a right deserves
special protection. In contrast, the joint opinion's replacement of formalism with
dreamy assertions such as, "'[a]t the heart of liberty is the right to define one's
own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of
human life,"'261 provide no practical guidelines for distinguishing on a neutral
basis the abortion right from other alleged rights falling under the general rubric
judgment) ("[T]o reach out so blatantly and unnecessarily to make new law in a case of this
kind is unabashedjudicial activism."); Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 663
(1989) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("I cannot join this latest sojourn into judicial activism."); New
Jersey v. T.L.O., 468 U.S. 1214, 1215 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Of late, the Court has
acquired a voracious appetite for judicial activism in its Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, at
least when it comes to restricting the constitutional rights of the citizen."); and United States
v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 250 (1967) (Black, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part) (stating
that to adopt the majority's rule of evidence on the basis of the Fourteenth Amendment "would
be 'judicial activism' at its worst").
Lower federal court judges are increasingly employing the "judicial activism" barb,
particularly when dissenting from a refusal to hear a controversial case en banc. For example,
the 5th Circuit affirmative action case, Hopwoodv. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996), drew
the commentary that
The label "judicial activism" is usually found in the lexicon of those voicing
concern about judges whom they perceive to be "liberal," fashioning remedies
beyond the scope of what is deemed to be appropriate under the law. Such
judicial legislating is generally excoriated as a "bad thing." Hopwoodv. State of
Texas is a text book example ofjudicial activism.
Hopwood v. Texas, 84 F.3d 720, 722 (5th Cir. 1996) (Politz, C.J., dissenting from failure to
grant rehearing en banc) (footnote omitted).
259. As of 1914, only nine states and the territory of Alaska permitted women to vote. See
WHICKER ET AL., supra note 89, at 120. The 19th Amendment, which holds that the right to
vote shall not be denied on the basis of gender, was not ratified until 1920. U.S. CONST. amend.
XIX. In this light, Rehnquist's oft-repeated temporal argument, which consists of tallying the
number of legislatures which had passed laws restricting abortion by 1868, see, e.g., Casey,
505 U.S. at 952 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), seems insensitive
and a bit disingenuous because it relies on the voting records of the completely male-dominated
legislatures-politically answerable only to male voters-to determine if a woman's right is
"firmly rooted."
260. Scalia states that he does not find a constitutional right to abortion "because of two
simple facts: (1) the Constitution says absolutely nothing about it, and (2) the longstanding
traditions of American society have permitted it to be legally proscribed." Casey, 505 U.S. at
980 (Scalia, J,. concurring in part and dissenting in part).
261. Id at 851.
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of individual liberty.262 The lack of rules which cabin the contours of the debate
will provide a broader target for Court detractors to hit.
One final criteria one might use to judge the success of a controversial case in
the electronic age is whether the opinion is written in a manner which connects
with a nonlawyer audience. Despite the shortcomings of the joint opinion, the
arguments are written in a natural style with clear language.263 Clarity can be an
important tool in maintaining the legitimacy of the Court in its
countermajoritarian role.2" If the people perceive incomprehensible opinions to
be an exercise in "lawyering" or worse, the political give and take of politicians,
the Court's image could be impugned. In addition, schizophrenic "concur as to
parts I, II and IV" situations detract from the fiction that the law is discovered
rather than created by judges and produce confusion as to what the law is. 265 It
was therefore important for the "center" of the Casey Court to join together to
produce one unified voice and thus offset the unified voice of Rehnquist, Scalia,
and Thomas.266
262. The problem created is one of consistency. For example, within the "right to define"
paradigm, it is difficult to explain why the state should, without any heightened scrutiny, be
permitted to categorically ban mind-altering drugs. Although one may postulate that the nature
of abortion is different from drug usage in terms of the life-altering effect of pregnancy on a
woman, the Court has not explicitly articulated a useful framework verifying the existence of
a distinction more profound than a bare subjective preference for a particular brand of
autonomy.
Some Justices have found this methodology useful, however. Justice Stevens in the recent
assisted suicide cases argued that: "Avoiding intolerable pain and the indignity of living one's
final days incapacitated and in agony is certainly '[a]t the heart of [the] liberty... to define
one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human
life."' Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2302, 2307 (1997) (Stevens, J., concurring)
(quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 851) (alterations in original).
263. See Lackland H. Bloom, Taking the People Seriously, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 885, 901
(1994) (book review) (noting that the Caseyjoint opinion, when explaining why it declined to
overrule Roe, was "written in a very clear and non-technical style"). In the view of some
scholars, such clarity is unfortunately not ajurisprudential norm. Over the past 20 to 30 years,
the Court's opinions "in even the most important and interesting cases have grown technical,
tedious, argumentative and fragmented." Id at 887. Yale law school professor Joseph Goldstein
notes that "[o]ur justices on the Court must never forget that the Constitution, which they
expound, emanated from Us, was meant to remain comprehensible to Us, and was established
for Our prosperity to endure and to be modified with Our informed consent." JOSEPH
GOLDSTEIN, THE INTELLIGIBLE CONsTITUrION 7 (1992).
264. Brown v. Board of Education is a model example of such clarity at a crucial moment
in American legal history. However, the "all deliberate speed" remedy, which purported to
enforce Brown's command to end segregated public education, was a model of studious
ambiguity. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955) (Brown II).
265. Goldstein points to the abortion case, Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492
U.S. 490 (1989), to be a textbook example of the problems associated with fractured opinions.
GOLDSTEIN, supra note 263, at 17.
266. In extremely controversial cases, such as Brown v. Board of Education, the Justices
have often abided by a "strength in numbers" rationale. See LAZARUS, supra note 150, at 474
("Just as the Court spoke unanimously in trying to quell resistance to Brown, the centrist trio
[in Casey] called in unison for acceptance of their version of Roe.").
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Although the joint opinion's prose is generally clear and accessible, the trio
neglected the most powerful tool of persuasion-storytelling.2 67 Justice Scalia
closed his opinion with a story of historical import to powerfully argue that the
joint opinion's attempt, in its words, to "call[] the contending sides of national
controversy to end their national division by accepting a common mandate rooted
in the Constitution" ' acquired an aura reminiscent of the infamous DredScott
v. Sanford decision. 69 To Justice Scalia, the lessons of history were clear. He
concluded: "It is no more realistic for us in this litigation, than it was for [Justice
Taney in Dred Scott] in that, to think that an issue of the sort they both
involved-an issue involving life and death, freedom and subjugation-can be
'speedily and finally settled' by the Supreme Court ... 2 0
Nevertheless, one might question whether the joint opinion really expected
interest groups and politicians to accept the "common mandate" announced by the
plurality. It is debatable whether Justices O'Connor and Kennedy actually relied
on cosmic substantive due process concepts, or envisioned Dworkin's
"constitution of principle," in light of the tone of their previous decisions."'
Some commentators speculate that factors wholly apart from the law influenced
O'Connor and Kennedy to join with Justice Souter in Casey.
First, the Justices are subject to internal peer pressure, a factor that may not be
fully appreciated. Court observer Christopher Smith theorizes that Justice Scalia's
incessant pounding of Kennedy and O'Connor with sharp sarcasm in previous
abortion decisions finally turned them against Scalia's ideas.272 However, at least
267. See GERRY SPENCE, How To ARGUE AND WIN EVERY TIME 114 (1995) ("[']he most
effective structure for any argument will always be [a] story.") (emphasis in original).
268. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 867 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
269. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). Scalia wrote:
There comes vividly to mind a portrait by Emanuel Leutze that hangs in the
Harvard Law School: Roger Brooke Taney, painted in 1859, the 82d year of his
life, the 24th of his Chief Justiceship, the second after his opinion in Dred Scott.
He is all in black, sitting in a shadowed red armchair, left hand resting upon a pad
of paper in his lap, right hand hanging limply, almost lifelessly, beside the inner
arm of the chair. He sits facing the viewer and staring straight out. There seems
to be on his face, and in his deep-set eyes, an expression of profound sadness and
disillusionment.
Casey, 505 U.S. at 1001-02 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
270. Id at 1002 (quoting President James Buchanan, Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1857), in
INAUGURAL ADDRESSES OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES, S. Doc. No. 101-10, at
126 (bicentennial ed. 1989)).
271. For example, in a 1983 abortion case, Justice O'Connor commented that:
Irrespective of what we may believe is wise or prudent policy in this difficult area,
"the Constitution does not constitute us as 'Platonic Guardians' nor does it vest
in this Court the authority to strike down laws because they do not meet our
standards of desirable social policy, 'wisdom,' or 'common sense."'
City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416, 453 (1983) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 242 (1982) (Burger, C.J., dissenting)).
272. SMITH, supra note 255, at 91-102. In addition, compare LAZARUS, supra note 150, at
224 (contending that Scalia early in his tenure on the Court was "domineering," "at times
rude," and "showed no deference to his colleagues"), with Justice Clarence Thomas, Remarks
1999]
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
as applied to O'Connor, this theory has been heartily challenged.273 Another
theory concerning Kennedy points to his supposed desire to offset the votes of
Justice Clarence Thomas.274 Second, there is the external political pressure which
the joint opinion explicitly figured into its decision to refrain from overruling Roe
v. Wade." 5 In addition, some have charged that Kennedy succumbed to the
"Greenhouse Effect," a desire to curry favor with elites inside the Beltway.276 As
for Souter, one can only speculate whether the vicious attacks on his character
and judicial record by interest groups at the time of his nomination influenced his
judicial philosophy on the Court.2 77
to the National Bar Association, Memphis, Tenn. (July 29, 1998), in WASH. TIMnES, July 31,
1998, at A21 ("Unlike the unfortunate practice or custom in Washington and in much of the
country, the Court is a model of civility.... I have yet to hear the first unkind words exchanged
among my colleagues.").
As the October 1997 term came to a close, Justice Ginsburg announced that collegiality at
the Court is much higher than in the recent past. "Again this year, in line with what may now
be the trend, the court's opinions so far have been steadily civil in tone." Richard Carelli,
Civility Reigns at Supreme Court, Associated Press, June 12, 1998, available in 1998 WL
6680568. Although acknowledging that Justice Scalia during that term attacked a majority
opinion with the disparaging words "feebleness" and "utter lack of logic," Ginsburg stated that
the author of the majority opinion in that case, Justice Stephen Breyer, "is not easily offended,
and he enjoys (Scalia's) sparkling wit, as I do." Id. Nevertheless, even though it appears the
Justices are professionals willing to take sharp criticism in stride, a fundamental and unresolved
question is with what stride laypersons may view such attacks.
273. Professor Marci Hamilton, who clerked for Justice O'Connor during the 1989-1990
term, dismisses this theory and notes that no external influences would sway O'Connor either
way. Hamilton believes that Scalia knew from the beginning that O'Connor would not overrule
Roe and thus he wrote his opinions in a boisterous manner with no fear of losing a future vote.
Finally, Hamilton points out that O'Connor articulated the undue burden standard early on and
posits that furthermore she is the most consistent member of the Court on the issue. Interview
with Marci A. Hamilton, Cardozo Law School Professor, in Bloomington, Ind. (Nov. 19,
1997).
274. This theory holds that the controversy surrounding the appointment of Clarence Thomas
caused Kennedy to second guess his initial rejection of Roe. See SMrr, supra note 255, at 126.
275. See discussion supra text accompanying note 233.
276. Federal Judge Laurence Silberman coined the term "Greenhouse Effect," which refers
to New York Times Supreme Court correspondent Linda Greenhouse. Wall Street Journal
editor Max Boot offers Justice Kennedy's opinions in Casey, Romer v. Evans, and the Virginia
Military Institute case as "evidence of how the capital's insidious influence can push
supposedly conservative judges into becoming activists." Max Boot, How Judges Can Make
Friends In Washington, WALL ST. J., July 13, 1998, at A15.
277. A press conference in September 1990 provides an apt example of the paradox that
many activists who continually call for the courts to nullify legislation hostile to their interests
(actions which the judiciary can take only if it is truly independent) will subsequently threaten
that very independence by reducing the judicial nomination process to a referendum on a
narrow set of political issues. See Burbank, supra note 33, at 41 ("Taken to extremes, the use
of criteria for appointments to the federal bench that are tied to an individual's views on
important issues of law and social policy can fairly be seen as an attempt to abort rather than
to predict the issue of judicial independence."); News Conference by Organizations Who
Oppose the Nomination of David Souter to the U.S. Supreme Court, Federal News Service,
Sept. 12, 1990, available in LEXIS, News Library, FEDNEW File. At the anti-Souter press




The Caseyjoint opinion correctly observed that "[t]he Court's power lies...
in its legitimacy, a product of substance and perception that shows itself in the
people's acceptance of the Judiciary as fit to determine what the Nation's law
means and to declare what it demands." '278 Within these pages, I have sought to
demonstrate that the rising majoritarianism will increasingly use technology to
perpetuate itself and that judges must recognize the potential dangers this trend
poses to judicial independence. However, I do not contend that the threat to the
judiciary posed by information technology is imminent. In the relatively near
future, the Internet and similar communication media will directly effect the
elections of state and federal legislators to such a degree that a candidate cannot
afford to neglect the new communication media.2"9 Careful consideration of the
technological difficulty far enough in advance will ease the transition for the
judiciary into this new era of human advancement.
Although many organizations seeking to protect judicial independence have
acknowledged the upsurge of harsh judicial criticism28 ° and recognize the
women, announcing that "We believe that this is a referendum on abortion rights for American
women.... [I]f it is the fifth vote... [because states will toughen abortion restrictions,] it
means that some women will lose their lives." Id. Center for Constitutional Rights
representative Pat Maher closed her remarks with the statement, "It is absolutely intolerable
to entertain the thought of someone like Souter in a society such as ours which should be
striving towards justice,... an acceptance of diversity and ... full human rights." Id. Maher
later added, "This thing, the Constitution, isn't just a notion, it isn't just a word, it is about real
life. David Souter knows nothing about real life. . . ." Id.
278. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 865 (1992). It is unfortunate that at a
moment in history when the electorate is restless and disillusioned with government, the Casey
Court appeared fractured (and the joint opinion impeccably vague) when declaring "what the
Nation's law means." Even worse, Justice Blackmun in Casey dared the other two branches to
challenge the Court's authority. See id at 924 (Blacknun, J., dissenting in part and concurring
in part) ("What has happened today should serve as a model for future Justices and a warning
to all who have tried to turn this Court into yet another political branch.").
279. See William Booth, Politicians Set Their Sites on the Web; More Are Going Online to
Woo Voters, Donors, Volunteers, WASH. POST, Oct 17, 1998, at Al. The Internet has not yet
advanced to the stage where political campaigns deem its importance to be comparable to that
of television. See Greg Miller & Esther Schrader, Internet's Role in Campaigns Still Limited,
L.A. THMEs, Oct. 28, 1998, at Al.
280. A 1996 American Bar Association report notes that "[a] new cycle of intense judicial
scrutiny and criticism are now upon us; one that has been forming over the last decade."
AMERICAN BAR ASSOC., AN INDEPENDENT JUDICIARY: REPORT OF THE COMMIssION ON THE
SEPARATION OF POWERS AND JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE at i (July 4, 1997), available in ABA
Governmental Affairs Office, An Independent Judiciary: Report of the Commission on the
Separation ofPowers and Judicial Independence (visited Jan. 28, 1999) <http://www.abanet
.org/govaffairs/judiciary/home.html>. However, that report also placed the current situation in
perspective, noting that "bashing judges has a long and distinguished tradition; indeed, many
of our esteemed presidents, including Jefferson, Lincoln and both Roosevelts, rebuked judges
of their day." Id. at vi.
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potential of new communications technology to educate the public,28" ' the
technological difficulty should be given attention commensurate with the
potential danger it poses to the current constitutional structure. Given the public's
considerable unfamiliarity with the history and role of the judiciary, education-a
long-standing goal of concerned members of the bar-will become far more
important than in the past.282
Although they undoubtedly were careful before, judges will observe that the
substance of what they write, the manner in which they write their opinions, and
what they say in public will be more heavily scrutinized as access to those
opinions broadens. The fine line between avoiding too much candor (which will
trigger the personal value judgment criticism) or not enough (thus drawing the
"disingenuous" charge) which every judge walks will become more precarious
with time. This will be particularly true in controversial cases where the stately
aura of formalism is no longer available to clearly separate the law from its
interpreter.283
Changes and constitutional proposals should not be met with a knee-jerk
response. Not every proposal to limit the power of federal judges should be
automatically attacked as an assault on the integrity of the judiciary branch with
dire consequences for constitutional rights. If the Constitution is a malleable
entity subject to being reinterpreted to reflect changes in society and culture,284
281. See id at 62 ("An understanding of the communications mechanism [(the Internet and
television)] by which children and adults learn about the justice and judicial systems is crucial
to the success of any educational program.").
282. One recommendation I will offer in this regard is that the Supreme Court syllabus
accompanying every opinion should also contain a summary of dissenting opinions. Posting
of Supreme Court material is often limited to the syllabus, due to space considerations and
readability, and although a majority opinion is the only true opinion of a court, to provide only
a summary of a majority opinion in a 5-4 decision can be misleading. Furthermore, if the
dissent is required to submit the bare bones of the opinion, it will be fairly free of any caustic
and misleading rhetoric.
283. It has been observed that "[i]n the past two generations the public philosophy of
America has shifted radically from a religious to a secular theory of law .... The radical
separation of law and religion in twentieth century American thought.., creates a serious
danger that law will not be respected." Harold J. Berman, The Interaction of Law and Religion,
8 CAP. U. L. REv. 345, 350-51 (1979).
284. Compare Justice William Brennan's view of the Constitution's adaptability with Justice
Scalia's perspective:
[T]he Constitution is not a static document whose meaning on every detail is
fixed for all time by the life experience of the Framers. We have recognized in a
wide variety of constitutional contexts that the practices that were in place at the
time any particular guarantee was enacted into the Constitution do not necessarily
fix forever the meaning of that guarantee.
Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 816 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
"[W]hen a strict interpretation of the Constitution, according to the fixed rules
which govern the interpretation of laws, is abandoned, and the theoretical
opinions of individuals are allowed to control its meaning, we have no longer a
Constitution; we are under the government of individual men, who for the time
being have power to declare what the Constitution is, according to their own
views of what it ought to mean."
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 984 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
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it is not untoward to suggest that the role of the branch interpreting that document
may need to change as well. If the judiciary and its defenders are willing to
objectively evaluate the validity of thoughtful, modest, and appropriate structural
limits on its power, then calls for substantive intrusions (such as impeachment for
ideological reasons) will more easily be labeled unreasonable.
Finally, despite the unrelenting focus on restraining the judiciary, the primary
source of the countermajoritarian difficulty today may be the Constitution.285
Judges, under the banner of a "living constitution," abandoned the original
meaning in an effort to sustain the document. The growing number of
contradictions and tensions within the Constitution which have grown over time286
suggest that the greatest document ever written in the history of government may
be due for a replacement. 2 7 Nevertheless, it is extremely unlikely that any such
dramatic change will transpire in the near future.288
dissenting in part) (quoting Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857) (Curtis, J.,
dissenting)).
285. See discussion supra Part I.
286. For example, the gender integration of the Virginia Military Institute ("VMI") in United
States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996), may be ajust result which would gain the support of
the American people if they were called upon to give the matter due consideration, but given
the pervasive gender bias of the time it is inconceivable that the founders of the 14th
Amendment believed they were opening VMI to women when they ratified the Amendment
in 1868. Likewise, the destruction of federalism and any significant limitations on the scope
of the Commerce Clause is so extensive that revival of the original vision may be
impracticable. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 601 n.8 (1995) (Thomas, J.,
concurring).
287. See TOFFLER, supra note 4, at 397 (declaring that governments across the globe will
have to revise their structures because "they are increasingly unworkable-no longer fitted to
the needs of a radically changed world").
288. See supra text accompanying note 67. Some theorists argue that the Constitution may
be amended by other means more flexible than the Article V amending process, a development
which would lessen the need for an entirely new constitution. For example, Professor Bruce
Ackerman argues that the United States has periodically experienced "constitutional moments,"
such as the New Deal "switch," when the people implicitly amended the Constitution and the
judiciary merely implemented the will of the people. BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE:
FOUNDATIONS passim (1991).
In contrast, Professor Akhil Amar argues that the American people "retain an unenumerated,
constitutional right to alter our Government and revise our Constitution" such that "an
amendment or new Constitution could be lawfully ratified by a simple majority of the American
electorate." Akhil Reed Amar, The Consent of the Governed: Constitutional Amendment
Outside Article V, 94 COLuM. L. REV. 457,958-59 (1994); see also AMAR & HIRSH, supra note
6, at 8-18. Whatever the merits of these two theories standing by themselves (both have drawn
criticism from a wide range of scholars), Professor Amar's view is clearly the superior of the
two. Whereas Professor Amar would rely on the express will of the people announced after an
open debate and casting of ballots (a process which he attempts to demonstrate is within the
Founders' original contemplation), Professor Ackerman's theory essentially attempts to
legitimize that which is patently illegitimate: His theory would establish a practice whereby
judges who, without even declaring to the people that they are amending the Constitution, do
not interpret but truly rewrite the Constitution and undertake this duty without any explicit
authority in the Constitution or the explicit consent of the people.
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Whatever the details of a solution to the technological difficulty, words from
the current Chief Justice of the Supreme .Court summarize the key to the
judiciary's success in the twenty-first century: "Change is the law of life, and the
judiciary will have to change to meet the challenges which will face it in the
future. But the independence of the federal judiciary is essential to its proper
functioning and must be retained."289
289. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, Keynote Address at the Washington College of
Law Centennial Celebration (Apr. 9, 1996), in Symposium on the Future of the Federal Courts,
46 AM. U. L. REv. 263, 274 (1996).
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